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CLOSED BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: GOVERNMENT
REVIEW OF CONSUMMATED MERGERS UNDER
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Scott A. Sher*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission")
and the Department of Justice ("DOJ")' have the authority
under section 7 of the Clayton Act ("section 7") to bring suit to
challenge previously closed mergers and acquisitions, where
they can demonstrate that a transaction may substantially
lessen competition.2 However, since the enactment of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 ("HSR
Act" or "Act"),3 such retrospective review has been rare. The
HSR Act requires parties to most mergers to report their
transactions to the antitrust agencies and to wait for approval
before closing.4 As a result, the Act has minimized the need
for drawn-out, post-close challenges to transactions that often
require lengthy, sometimes years-long, divestiture trials. The
results of such trials often ineffectively restore the pre-merger
competitive landscape, as it is usually impossible to "un-
scramble" a combined entity years after the close of a merger.5Likewise, in fast-moving dynamic markets, it is infeasible, if
* Scott Sher is a partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC. The author
would like to thank Alisa Armstrong, David Balto, Chris Compton, Michael
Cowie, and Lisa Davis for their helpful suggestions and revisions. The author
would like to offer special thanks to Scott Russell for his insight and assistance
during the writing and editing process.
1. Throughout the remainder of this article the DOJ and FTC will be re-
ferred to collectively as the "antitrust agencies."
2. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
3. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-435,
Sept. 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 1383 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000)).
4. See id § 18a(a).
5. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2637, 2643.
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW Vol: 45
not undesirable, to recreate a status quo environment which
time has already passed. As foreshadowed by Congress dur-
ing the debate over its passage, the HSR Act has assisted "the
business community in planning and predictability, by mak-
ing it more likely that Clayton Act cases will be resolved in a
timely and effective fashion. "'
Nevertheless, the antitrust agencies still bring post-close
challenges-and since 2001 have been more aggressive-
where the alleged competitive concerns associated with a deal
were not readily apparent before close. Beginning in 2001,
the FTC has brought challenges to consummated mergers in-
volving MSC.Software, Chicago Bridge, Airgas, and Aspen
Technology, and has seriously investigated dozens more.'
These post-close challenges raise complex legal issues in-
cluding the role of post-acquisition evidence in merger review
6. Id.
7. See In re Aspen Tech. Inc., No. 9310 (F.T.C. filed Aug. 6, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/08/aspencmp.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review); In re MSC.Software Corp., No. 9299 (F.T.C.
Oct 29, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/ll/mscdo.pdf (last visited Oct. 24,
2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review); In re Airgas, Inc., No. C-4029
(F.T.C. filed Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001J10/airgascmp.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review); In re Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co., No. 9300 (F.T.C. filed Oct. 25, 2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/chicagobridgeadmincmp.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
The Commission has recognized that such post-close investigations raise
significant problems, even where the investigation does not result in an en-
forcement order. In its recent decision to close an investigation into the con-
summated merger of the only two manufacturers of possible therapies for a rare
childhood disorder called Pompe Disease, the Chairman of the FTC, Timothy
Muris, recognized the dangers associated with post-close review and enforce-
ment, noting that FTC-ordered post-consummation relief could unwind transac-
tions that have created real efficiencies in the market. See Press Release, FTC
Closes its Investigation of Genzyme Corporation's 2001 Acquisition of No-
vazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (Jan. 13, 2004), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/01/genzyme.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review). As this article discusses in further detail,
fashioning remedies is also a critical problem in actions involving consummated
mergers. See discussion infra Part IV. As FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones-
Harbour observed, "[elnthusiasm for justifiable enforcement must always be
disciplined, however, by pragmatic considerations regarding the ability to
achieve effective relief in a given case." Statement of Comm'r Pamela Jones-
Harbour, Genzyme Corporation's Acquisition of Novazyme Pharmaceuticals
Inc., File No. 021-0026 at 4 (2004), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2004/01harbourgenzymestmt.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with the
Santa Clara Law Review).
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and the appropriate scope of relief available under section 7.V
Since the passage of the HSR Act, the Supreme Court has not
considered a challenge from the antitrust agencies to a closed
merger, and lower court review of such challenges likewise
has been limited.9 As a result, the law on post-close review
and challenge is dated, and in many instances, inappropriate
to apply in the current HSR Act regulatory environment.
The effect of post-consummation review and challenge is
substantial and potentially harmful to the parties, to the
market, and ultimately to consumers as well. For example, in
the recent MSC.Software litigation over the company's acqui-
sition of two small rivals-which arguably gave the company
a monopoly in a specialized software market-the parties liti-
gated the case for more than a year.0 Ultimately after spend-
ing millions of dollars in legal fees, MSC.Software was forced
to divide its advanced Nastran business into multiple units,
licensing its software and all improvements to one or two in-
dependent firms." The costs were high and the relief was ex-
pansive. Both surely outweighed any benefits that the com-
pany could ever have contemplated when it originally
considered acquiring two of its small rivals.
With these concerns in mind, this article explores the is-
sues surrounding antitrust review of consummated mergers.
Part II begins with an overview of the history of modern anti-
trust merger law, from the enactment of the Sherman Act in
1890 through the passage of the HSR Act in 1976.12 Part III
discusses the pertinent issues associated with post-close re-
view and challenge, including the appropriate standard of re-
view, the probative value of post-acquisition evidence, and the
remedies available under section 7.13 Finally, Part IV sum-
marizes the significant problems associated with the post-
consummation review and challenge of potentially anticom-
8. See discussion infra Part III.B, Part III.C.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enter., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Iowa
1991).
10. See In re MSC.Software Corp., No. 9299 (F.T.C. filed Oct. 9, 2001), deci-
sion and order issued Oct. 29, 2002, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/11/mscdo.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
11. Seeid. at 6-8.
12. See discussion infra pp. 44-56.
13. See discussion infra pp. 56-95.
2004
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petitive transactions. 14
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ANTITRUST MERGER
LAW
To fully comprehend the troubling nature of expansive
post-close merger review, it is important to understand the
development of modern merger antitrust law. The legislative
history behind the enactment of each of the major antitrust
statutes sheds light on the reasons why post-close review to-
day should be limited, and also helps explain why outdated
law concerning post-close review has little applicability in to-
day's regulatory environment, where pre-notification of most
transactions is required, 5 and where theories of competitive
harm have changed significantly since the time that case law
was decided. 6
Modern antitrust merger law developed over the course
of more than half a century. Congress began with the enact-
ment of the Sherman Act in 1890,17 later passing the Clayton
Act in 1914," amending it in 1950 (known as the Celler-
Kefauver amendments), 9 and again in 1976 (the HSR Act).
20
Congress acted to strengthen the antitrust laws in response
to a decision or series of decisions from the Supreme Court
that effectively had rendered existing law powerless to rem-
edy what many considered a troubling tide of increasing con-
centration in the American economy.2' This article next ex-
plores in greater detail the enactment and rationale behind
these antitrust statutes as well as the setbacks that the Su-
preme Court delivered to each.
14. See discussion infra pp. 95-98.
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
16. See, e.g, discussion infra note 71.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
18. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (originally enacted Oct. 15, 1914, ch.
323, 38 Stat. 730).
19. Celler-Kefauver Amendments, Pub. L. No. 81-899, Dec. 29, 1950, 64
Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).
20. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, Sept. 30, 1976, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390-1394 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18a (2000)).
21. See, e.g, 51 CONG. REC. 14200, 14222 (1914) (statement of Sen. Thomp-
son); 51 CONG. REC. 9245, 9271 (1914) (statement of Sen. Carlin).
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A. Early Failures Under the Sherman Act
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act.2" Section 1
provides that "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade ... is declared to be illegal."23 Then, over
the course of the next two decades, the Supreme Court cur-
tailed the scope of section 1, destroying the very essence of
the Act. 4 Following the passage of the Sherman Act, the gov-
ernment brought-and lost-a series of suits seeking to dis-
solve or restrict some of the larger conglomerations of the
time.25
In 1895, in the first Sherman Act case to reach the Su-
preme Court, the government sought dissolution of the Sugar
Trust 2' by suing the American Sugar Refining Company
which commanded a sixty-five percent market share of the
domestic sugar refining and sales market. The company had
successively acquired four smaller sugar-refining companies,
which added thirty percent of the remaining refining and
sales shares in the country. 27 The government alleged a viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act, claiming that the combi-
nation constituted monopolization of the manufacture and
sale of refined sugar in the United States, resulting in the
control of sugar prices.28 Further, these acquisitions allegedly
constituted "contracts" with the intent to monopolize, equat-
ing to a conspiracy to restrain trade, which, in the opinion of
the government, was clearly within the ambit of section 1.29
The Supreme Court agreed that the purchase of the four
Philadelphia refineries' stock coupled with its own stock re-
sulted in "the American Sugar Refining Company acquir[ing]
nearly complete control of the manufacture of refined sugar
within the United States.""°  Nevertheless, the Court con-
22. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also id. § 2 (prohibiting unilateral conduct
intended to monopolize a market).
24. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 1, 88-89 (1911), and FTC v. Western Meat
Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). See also 51 CONG. REC. 9538, 9552-3 (1914) (state-
ment of Sen. Barkley) (discussing how the Supreme Court limited the scope of
the Sherman Act).
25. See supra note 24.
26. See E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1.
27. Id. at 2-5.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 9.
2004
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cluded that relief pursuant to the Sherman Act was beyond
the scope of the statute. 1 According to the Court, the
Sherman Act was concerned with contracts that restrained
interstate or international trade 2 and interstate commerce
remained unaffected by the exchange of voting securities.3
Following the Sugar Trust case, the Supreme Court fur-
ther restricted the ability of the Sherman Act to effectively
combat mergers that could lessen competition. This culmi-
nated with the Standard Oil decision, where the Supreme
Court held that only unreasonable restraints of trade were il-
legal.34 To establish illegality, the government had to demon-
strate that a combination actually caused competitive harm.35
The Court interpreted the Sherman Act as powerless to halt
mergers or acquisitions that do not themselves constitute un-
reasonable restraints of trade.36
In other words, unless the merging parties intended an ill
motive when entering into the merger, and only if the gov-
ernment could demonstrate that the merger harmed competi-
tion, would a merger be illegal under the Sherman Act. As a
result, the government could only use the Sherman Act to
challenge and remedy concentrations in markets that already
had harmed competition. 37 The Act could not redress incipi-
ent concentrations that did not immediately manifest com-
petitive harm at the time of the merger. Thus, before chal-
lenging a transaction, the government would have to wait
until its effects had become apparent in the marketplace. Of
course, by that time, it would be nearly impossible to unwind
such a combination, as the independent corporate assets and
structure of the merging parties would have disappeared.
B. Enactment of the Clayton Act and Early Failures Under
that Statute
The early Sherman Act decisions prompted Congress to
reexamine the antitrust laws and to consider a new legal re-
31. Id. at 17.
32. See E.. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 17.
33. Id.
34. Standard Oil Co., 222 U.S. at 88-89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 81-82.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 88-93 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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gime to lessen the increasing corporate concentration.38 Sena-
tor Barkley, a primary proponent of the Clayton Bill, opined
that "[n]otwithstanding that law [the Sherman Act] has been
in force for 24 years, combinations, trusts, and monopolies
have increased at a marvelous rate and have grown so enor-
mous in size as almost to stagger with bewilderment and con-
fusion the mind that undertakes to contemplate or unravel
them."39 The Supreme Court rendered the Sherman Act inca-
pable of effectively addressing this trust problem,40 and an-
other of the Clayton Act's sponsors, Senator Thompson, ex-
pressed his conviction that this problem had corrupted the
American way of life:
Neither at birth, in life, nor at death are we free from
trusts. We are welcomed into the world by the Milk Trust
and rocked in a cradle built by the Furniture Trust. As we
proceed through life we find practically everything we eat
and everything we wear furnished by a trust and nearly
every business in which we may wish to engage com-
pletely monopolized; and at last, as we approach death, we
are brought face to face with the Coffin Trust, by which we
are finally conveyed to our last resting place.4'
In an attempt to address the trust problem, Congress
passed the Clayton Act. 42 According to Senator Thompson,
the antitrust legislation's chief purpose was to protect "the
public, to protect it from extortion practiced by the trust, but
at the same time not to take away from it any advantages of
cheapness or better service which honest, intelligent coopera-
tion may bring."4"
As enacted in 1914, the Clayton Act prohibited a number
of business practices, including anticompetitive acquisitions.4
At the time of enactment, section 7 prohibited the acquisition
of "stock or other share capital of another corporation...
where the effect of such acquisition is to eliminate or substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition."45
38. Id.
39. 51 CONG. REC. 9538, 9552 (1914) (statement of Sen. Barkley).
40. See id.
41. 51 CONG. REC. 14200, 14222 (1914) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
42. 51 CONG. REC. 9245, 9271 (1914) (statement of Sen. Carlin).
43. 51 CONG. REC. 14200, 14223 (1914) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
44. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
2004
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Whereas the Sherman Act was designed to eliminate ac-
tual and unreasonable restraints of trade that already ex-
isted, the Clayton Act, according to Congress, "go[es] further
than that. These acts are made unlawful wherever the effect
may be to substantially lessen competition or may tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 6 Thus, the Clay-
ton Act's proponents reasoned that the government could
block a transaction from closing even if it did not actually
harm competition at the outset, so long as the government
could demonstrate that if allowed to proceed, the transaction
sometime in the future was likely to harm competition.47
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court convinc-
ingly dashed the hopes of many Clayton Act proponents and
eviscerated the intended purpose of section 7. In a series of
decisions, the Court interpreted section 7 to allow businesses,
through technical formalisms, to effectively and completely
circumvent any governmental challenge to a business combi-
nation that represented even the most egregious concentra-
tion in a market. 8
In two consolidated cases, FTC v. Thatcher Manufactur-
ing Co. 69 and Swift & Co. v. FTC,0 the Court held that sec-
tion 7 applied only to mergers by stock acquisitions and did
not address the acquisition of assets or property, even where
the acquisition of assets and property could only be effectu-
ated following the acquisition of voting securities.5' In
Thatcher and Swift, the defendant companies acquired the
stock of their rivals and the FTC subsequently brought suit
under section 7.52 Before the FTC could secure an order of di-
vestiture of the stock, Thatcher and Swift completed the ac-
quisitions of the assets and property, making the voting secu-
rities of the acquired parties by themselves worthless. 5'3 The
Court concluded that the FTC was powerless to order divesti-
46. 51 CONG. REC. 16316, 16318 (1914) (statement of Sen. Floyd).
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). See infra pp.
48-49.
49. FTC v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 5 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1925).
50. Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1925).
51. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 5 F.2d 615 and Swift & Co., 8 F.2d 595 were consoli-
dated upon appeal to the Supreme Court and decided together with Western
Meat Co., 4. F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1925). The citation for all three cases is 272 U.S.
554 (1926).
52. 272 U.S. at 560.
53. Id. at 559-60.
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ture of anything besides the voting securities of another com-
pany.' According to the Court, the Clayton Act withheld from
the government the ability to order a company to surrender
the assets or property acquired from others.55 The Court
opined that "[t]he Act has no application to ownership of a
competitor's property and business obtained prior to any ac-
tion by the Commission, even though this was brought about
through stock unlawfully held. The purpose of the Act was to
prevent continued holding of stock and the peculiar evils inci-
dent thereto."56
Later, in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC,
7
the Court completely stripped the government's enforcement
ability under section 7, concluding that the Act did not apply
once a merger had already been effectuated." In Arrow-Hart,
the FTC challenged the acquisition of voting securities by a
holding company.5 Following the issuance of the complaint,
the holding company merged the voting securities of the enti-
ties under its corporate umbrella and dissolved the voting se-
curities of the independent companies. 5 The Court concluded
that the act of extinguishing the independent entities' stock
eliminated the ability of the FTC to challenge the transac-
tions under the Clayton Act, as that statute was only con-
cerned with aggregations of voting securities and not with
aggregations of assets." Therefore, the FTC could not seek
relief once the acquired entity's voting securities had been
dissolved, or if the transaction was technically structured as a
sale of assets, rather than a sale of voting securities.
Not surprisingly, following these decisions, corporate
transactions were organized in manners designed to exploit
the limitations carved out by the judiciary.62 Indeed, prior to
the Act being amended in 1950, the government was unsuc-
cessful challenging mergers under section 7.
54. Id. at 561.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
58. Id. at 595-96.
59. Id. at 591.
60. Id. at 590-91.
61. Id. at 595-96. After Arrow-Hart, mergers structured as sales of assets
were not prohibited by section 7.
62. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
2004
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C. 1950 Amendments Closed Clayton Act Loopholes
Twice thwarted by the Supreme Court, Congress again
sought to strengthen the federal government's antitrust en-
forcement capabilities by closing the loopholes opened by the
Court and exploited by the business community. In 1950,
Congress passed the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the
Clayton Act. 3 As the Supreme Court indicated in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States: "[t]he dominant theme pervading
congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a
fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic
concentration in the American economy."' The House Report
accompanying the amendments to the Clayton Act notes:
That the current merger movement (during the years
1940-1947) has had a significant effect on the economy is
clearly revealed by the fact that the asset value of the
companies which have disappeared through mergers
amounts to 5.2 billion dollars, or no less than 5.5 percent
of the total assets of all manufacturing corporations-a
significant segment of the economy to be swallowed up in
such a short period of time.65
According to Senator Carey Estes Kefauver: "[t]he
Sherman Act test has been a measurement of accomplished
monopoly. The purpose of the Clayton Act is to reach in their
incipiency certain practices which if permitted to persist
might eventually ripen into violations of the Sherman Act."'
The Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act passed
in both Houses of Congress.67 This initiated the third effort to
provide the government with the ability to challenge the
growing concentration in America's industries.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
summarized the legislative rationale behind the enactment of
the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act:
"[P]lug the loophole" in section 7 by including as-
set acquisitions under the umbrella of section 7
63. Celler-Kefauver Amendments, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).
64. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315.
65. Id. at 316, n.27 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3).
66. 96 CONG. REC. 16433, 16453 (1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver).
67. Celler-Kefauver Amendments, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).
Vol: 45
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review;
68
* Include vertical and conglomerate acquisitions
within the purview of section 7, rather than just
horizontal mergers;"
* Capture "incipient" mergers whose effects on com-
petition were "probable" rather than "actual;"
70
and
* Express the Act's intention to deal with probabili-
ties rather than with certainties. Thus,
"Im]ergers with a probable anticompetitive effect
were to be proscribed by this Act."
71
The Clayton Act amendments and the subsequent Su-
preme Court interpretations of the scope of the FTC's en-
forcement power to review and challenge mergers equipped
the government with the necessary tools to unwind transac-
tions that potentially raised competitive concerns. After
these changes, it appears that the pendulum wildly swung in
the other direction: following 1950, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the amended section 7 in such a manner that antitrust
authorities were granted the power to challenge even the
most incipient of concentrations. For example, during the
68. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 316.
69. Id. at 317. Horizontal mergers refer to those mergers between parties
with competing product lines. Vertical mergers refer to those mergers that re-
sult in the vertical integration of product lines or businesses. Conglomerate
mergers refer to those mergers that result in the aggregation of complementary,
rather than competitive, product lines.
70. Id. at 317-18.
71. Id. at 323, n.39. A significant source of tension in antitrust law has
been the definition of the term "anticompetitive." Whereas in Brown Shoe the
Supreme Court articulated that any increase in concentration could be consid-
ered anticompetitive, the antitrust agencies and the case law today embrace a
much different meaning of the term. Post-1968, when the first set of antitrust
guidelines was released, the prevailing antitrust thinking began to change.
This "Chicago-School" thinking, which is accepted today by the mainstream,
does not consider mere concentration anticompetitive (i.e., as necessarily lead-
ing to increased prices and other market power abuses). Instead, only where
the government demonstrates that such transactions actually cause harm to
consumer welfare, would antitrust concerns arise. See William J. Kolasky &
Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into
the Antitrust ReTvew of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (2003).
This change in economic thinking is reflected in more recent merger pol-
icy, but is not apparent in older post-close challenges that were litigated mostly
in the 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, much of the case law that exists con-
cerning the nature of post-close challenges is irrelevant, outdated, and inconsis-
tent with our understanding of the role of antitrust in merger analysis. See,
e.g., discussion infra Part III.B, Part III.C.
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1960s, the government was successful in bringing actions for
divestiture where firms aggregated through transaction only
miniscule shares of sales in a particular market.72 It ap-
peared that Congress' intent to arrest incipient concentra-
tions in the market had been realized.
D. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 Establishes Modern Merger Review
Even equipped with the amended and more expansive
Clayton Act, the government nonetheless was at a disadvan-
tage when seeking to challenge anticompetitive mergers or
acquisitions because Congress had not required a pre-close
notification that would forewarn the government of such
looming anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. Thus,
"without advance notice of an impending merger, data rele-
vant to its legality, and at least several weeks to prepare a
case, the government often [had] no meaningful chance to
carry its burden of proof, and win a preliminary injunction
against a merger that appears to violate section 7. "73 Without
the opportunity to gather evidence to demonstrate to a court
that a transaction in the early stages raised competitive con-
cerns, the government's ability to successfully block such a
transaction was highly circumscribed. In fact, as an impor-
tant early study of pre-close challenges to mergers suggests,
the government's success rate in such challenges was abys-
mal.74
In the absence of advance notice requirements, parties of-
ten clandestinely and speedily merged operations (the so-
called midnight merger phenomenon), forcing the government
to challenge the transaction following its closing with insuffi-
cient/inadequate evidence. As noted in the legislative history
to the HSR Act: "[tlhe government may well file suit, and ul-
timately win the subsequent litigation on the merits ... [y]et
by the time it wins the victory ... it is often too late to enforce
72. See, e.g., United States v. Vons' Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (block-
ing merger that would have given combined company less than ten percent
share of the Los Angeles grocery store market).
73. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2637, 2640.
74. See Malcolm R. Pfunder et al., Compliance with Divestiture Orders un-
der Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 THE
ANTITRUST BULLETIN 19 (1972).
Vol: 45
2004 CLAYTONACT
effectively the Clayton Act."" This is because "[d]uring the
course of the post-merger litigation, the acquired firm's as-
sets, technology, marketing systems, and trademarkets are
replaced, transferred, sold off or combined with those of the
acquiring firm. Similarly, its personnel and management are
shifted, retrained, or simply discharged."76 With this "scram-
bling" of the merging entities, it becomes nearly impossible to
unwind the transaction and restore the "acquired firm to its
former status as an independent competitor."77
Further, post-acquisition challenges resulted in pro-
tracted divestiture proceedings, which often lasted years or
decades and cost the parties millions of dollars." Then, once
the proceedings had ended, appropriate remedies often could
not be fashioned, because either the government could not
identify a suitable buyer, the assets of the two parties had be-
come too intertwined to separate through a divestiture order,
or the acquiring firm had purposefully stalled the investiga-
75. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2637, 2640.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 9, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2641.
78. Such was the case with El Paso Energy Company, which famously ex-
tended its merger litigation by a decade. As well-summarized by then Director
of the Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, William Baer:
It helps to begin with the reasons Congress enacted HSR in the first
place. The poster child in the legislative debate was the tortured litiga-
tion history of United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. The case,
brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act, involved the government's
post-acquisition challenge of El Paso's purchase of a potential competi-
tor, Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. ("PNW"). PNW already had a
supply line running from New Mexico to the Pacific Northwest, and it
wanted to sell excess supplies to customers in California, where El
Paso was the sole supplier. El Paso promptly bought PNW, and the De-
partment of Justice challenged the acquisition. After seven years of
litigation, the Supreme Court ruled for the government and ordered di-
vestiture "without delay." The unintended irony in that phase had be-
come apparent to Congress when it enacted HSR. Divestiture in the El
Paso case took an additional ten years, meaning that it took a total of
17 years before the government could cure an anticompetitive acquisi-
tion. The case went to the Supreme Court so many times some folks
lost count. It was estimated that El Paso derived profits of $10 million
for every year it retained the illegally acquired company. All of this
took place in an effort to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act, a statute
whose purpose was to stop anticompetitive acts in their incipiency.
William J. Baer, Reflections on 20 Years of Merger Enforcement Under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Prepared Remarks Before The Conference Board (Oct.
29, 1996) (citations omitted), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/hsrspeec.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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tion and trial, while wasting the acquired party's assets and
making the latter unattractive to any potential buyer."9
Focusing on the inherent limitations and deficiencies of
the Clayton Act's reactionary orientations, Congress enacted
the HSR Act to eliminate the deleterious effects of post-
consummation challenges.0 It was designed to provide the
antitrust agencies with a mechanism whereby parties were
required to pre-notify their intent to enter into mergers of a
certain size and to give the agencies time to review such
transactions before allowing the parties to consummate the
deal.8" According to the House of Representatives, substantial
costs accompany post-close review "to the firms, the courts,
and the marketplace. ... To avoid the worst of these pro-
tracted exercises in futility is the major purpose of this bill.
Merger litigation simply need not always continue for years
and even decades-but if it takes place after consummation, it
generally will .... ""
The HSR Act, however, does not capture all transactions
that potentially raise competitive concerns: the HSR Act
mandates pre-close review only of transactions that exceed a
certain size8 thus "smaller, illegal mergers may still be con-
summated, despite passage of this bill, and there may still be
lengthy divestiture trials in future years"' Since the size of a
transaction acts only as a rough proxy (at best) to identify
transactions that may raise antitrust concerns, it is possible
that transactions that do not required notification under the
HSR Act will nevertheless require government-ordered re-
dress pursuant to section 7.
Additionally, Congress amended the HSR Act to reduce
the number of transactions subject to pre-closing review re-
quirements."8 In late 2000, the statute was amended to re-
79. See id.
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
81. H.R. REP NO. 94-1373, at 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637,
2637.
82. Id. at 10, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2642.
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000) (also referred to as section 7a of the Clayton
Act) (detailing the size of transaction test triggering the obligation to file a pre-
merger notification with the antitrust agencies).
84. H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 11 (1976), repinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2637, 2643.
85. See Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 1(a)(2), 114 Stat. 2762 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18a (2000)); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 8680 (F.T.C. Feb. 1, 2001) (interim
rules published by the FTC interpreting congressional amendment to the HSR
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quire the reporting of transactions valued at $50 million or
more." Prior to the 2000 amendments, transactions valued at
$15 million or more were captured under the HSR Act.87 As a
result, today, fewer transactions require reporting under the
Act. According to the FTC, some of these smaller transac-
tions (valued at between $15 and $50 million) may violate
section 7 because such deals may still substantially lessen
competition within relatively narrow markets.88 It follows
that transactions which, prior to their close, might have re-
quired modification or challenge if reported under the pre-
amended HSR Act, today may require antitrust agency inter-
vention, pursuant to section 7 of the Clayton Act, following
consummation because they are too small to be reported un-
der the recalibrated thresholds. 9 Thus, in the wake of the
higher reporting thresholds, post-consummation merger chal-
lenges are likely to increase in number and significance.
The enactment of the HSR Act has also had an ancillary
effect: today, most merger challenges occur before close, and
as a result, generally are settled pursuant to a consent de-
cree, whereby the parties agree to some form of relief (struc-
tural or behavioral) and the government allows the merger to
close.9" Consequently, post-close challenges largely have be-
come unnecessary, and whereas litigation followed by formal,
published opinion was once the norm, today it is the rare ex-
ception. Thus, in the twenty-five years since the enactment of
the HSR Act, little case law has developed that explores the
contours of post-consummation review and challenge, and the
scope of relief available under section 7. Much of the decades-
Act in late 2000, revising 16 C.F.R. pts. 801, 802, and 803).
86. Pub. L. No. 106-553, Dec. 21, 2000, 114 Stat. 2762 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2000)).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (1999).
88. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Challenges
MSC.Software's Acquisitions of Its Two Nastran Competitors (Oct. 10, 2001), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/200110/msc.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with
the Santa Clara Law Review). Former Director of the Bureau of Competition
Joseph J. Simons states that challenging non-reportable deals "is particularly
important now because the thresholds for reporting acquisitions have been
raised." See id. However, the increased thresholds only recalibrate the scope of
the statute to make it consistent with the thresholds as they existed in 1976.
See id. The Act had never been indexed to inflation, and for the first twenty-
five years, the thresholds never increased. See id.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
90. H.R. REP No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637,
2642.
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old law seems outmoded and inadequate at addressing many
of the issues that arise when reviewing transactions in to-
day's economy. This article next discusses the outdated case
law applicable when reviewing contemporary transactions.9'
III. CASE LAW CONCERNING THE REVIEW OF
CONSUMMATED MERGERS
Case law regarding the substantive and procedural is-
sues that arise during challenges to consummated mergers
has remained relatively stagnant since the enactment of the
HSR Act in 1976. However, with the FTC's stated intention
to more actively review and challenge allegedly anticompeti-
tive consummated transactions, undoubtedly many of these
issues will become salient once again.9" Historically, the case
law explored most frequently several issues including: (a) the
relevant time-the merger's consummation or the filing of the
suit-to determine the transaction's effect on the market;9' (b)
the relevance of post-acquisition evidence to demonstrate
whether the transaction violates section 7;94 and (c) the
breadth of relief that the Commission can order after conclud-
ing that a closed transaction violates section 7.95
At the Commission level, the last several challenges to
consummated mergers have considered some of these key le-
gal issues. For example, in MSCSoftware Corp.,96 the admin-
istrative litigation (which ultimately resulted in a negotiated
consent without a final decision from the Administrative Law
Judge), focused on the role of post-acquisition evidence and on
the scope of the Commission's authority under section 7 to
grant structural relief beyond a divestiture of the assets in-
volved in an anticompetitive concentration.97  Likewise, in
91. See discussion infra Part III.
92. See supra note 88.
93. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
588-89 (1957).
94. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
95. See, e.g., In re Diamond Alkali Co., 72 F.T.C. 700, 740 (1967).
96. See In re MSC.Software Corp., No. 9299 (F.T.C. October 29, 2002), at
http://www.fte.gov/os/2002/l/mscdo.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with
the Santa Clara Law Review).
97. See Respondent MSC.Software Corporation's Pre-Trial Brief and Pro-
posed Conclusions of Law at 64-66 & 84-92, In re MSC.Software Corp., No. 9299
(F.T.C. July 1, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9299/020701rmscptb.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N. V 98 (on appeal as of November 1,
2004, to the full Commission), the parties disagree over
whether the Administrative Law Judge sufficiently consid-
ered alternative remedial options when deciding to order Chi-
cago Bridge to divest assets it acquired as a result of a
merger, as well as whether section 7 gives the FTC the au-
thority to order a divestiture of assets beyond those which are
part of the competitive overlap that raised section 7 prob-
lems.99
A. Relevant Point in Time to Review Competitive Effects
In United States v. E.i du Pont de Nemours & Co.1 ' ("du
Pont'), the Supreme Court held that the government can
bring suit under section 7 any time it believes a transaction
may cause a substantial lessening of competition.' The gov-
ernment can rely upon market conditions at the time of suit-
rather than at the time of the merger-to demonstrate that a
transaction represents an incipient competitive concern."°2 At
the time, the decision was considered a significant expansion
of the scope of section 7, providing new ammunition with
which the antitrust agencies could challenge anticompetitive
consolidations. o
Until du Pont, the government's ability to challenge
transactions as anticompetitive was limited. As discussed
above, the federal government, thwarted by Supreme Court
decisions restricting the scope of the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act, largely was seen as powerless to halt the in-
creasing concentration in America's industries." Du Pont
changed that landscape. An overview of the facts that led to
the du Pont decision is crucial to understanding its scope.
98. See In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 9300 (F.T.C. Oct. 25, 2001); at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/chicagobridgeadmincmp.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
99. See Respondents' Appeal Brief at 52-57 (Public Records Version), In re
Chicago Bridge & Iron Comp., No. 9300 (F.T.C. Aug. 8, 2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9300/030808respondentsappealbrief.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 24, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
100. E.1 duPontdeNemours, 353 U.S. 586.
101 Seeid
102. Id. at 597-98.
103. Seeid. at 590-91.
104. See discussion supra Part II.A, Part II.B.
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1. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. °5
In 1917, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. ("du Pont") be-
gan a purchasing program of the stock of General Motors
Corporation ("GM").'0° The purchasing was completed in
1919.07 At the time of suit, du Pont owned approximately
twenty-three percent of GM's outstanding voting securities
and claimed that it purchased GM shares solely for the pur-
pose of investment, rather than to take an active role in the
management of that company.'08 Nevertheless, over the fol-
lowing years, up until the time when the Department of Jus-
tice brought an antitrust suit, du Pont and GM maintained a
close relationship. 09 Du Pont regularly sought-and often
won-contracts to supply GM with certain automotive prod-
ucts. "0 Du Pont maintained a position on the GM Board of
Directors, and, in fact, members of the du Pont family or
company held, at one time or another, the presidency and the
chairman position at GM."' As an active and influential
shareholder and director, du Pont acquired information con-
cerning confidential GM business dealings, including sensi-
tive information regarding GM's product plans and compo-
nent needs, as well as the status of bids from other GM
suppliers."2
Du Pont used its position to attempt to garner more GM
business, leveraging its stock ownership to persuade GM to
increase its reliance on du Pont as a supplier."3 With the GM
management's assistance, du Pont regularly succeeded in fos-
tering its relationship with GM, notwithstanding opposition
from divisions of GM arguing that du Pont should compete for
GM business like the other suppliers."' Specifically, du
Pont's sales to GM were substantial in two crucial supply ar-
eas: du Pont provided nearly seventy percent of GM's automo-
tive finishes and forty percent of its automotive fabrics."'
105. EL. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586.
106. Id. at 598-99.
107. Id. at 602.
108. Id. at 588, 602.
109. Id. at 601-02.
110. Id. at 602.
111. El du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 601-02.
112. Id. at 601.
113. Id. at 602.
114. Id. at 602-05.
115. Id. at 596.
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In 1949, the DOJ challenged the du Pont/GM stock and
business relationship under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, and section 7 the Clayton Act.1 16  The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of du Pont on all
claims." ' On the Sherman Act claims, the district court con-
cluded that the parties' actions did not constitute illegal busi-
ness relations designed to stifle competition."' On the Clay-
ton Act claim, the court held that when du Pont acquired its
GM stock, du Pont intended to hold the stock solely for pur-
pose of investment."9 The court also found it implausible that
at that time the investment could not be construed as a rela-
tionship that would substantially reduce competition.
120
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's holding
with respect to the Clayton Act claim.' Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Brennan concluded that the GM investment
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.'2 ' The Court did not
reach the DOJ's claims under either section 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act.' The Court's reliance on section 7 was pecu-
liar, as the DOJ's oral argument made no mention of the sec-
tion 7 claim and its brief relied almost exclusively on the
Sherman Act claims."2
The du Pont decision was a landmark for several reasons.
This article discusses only one of them: the point in time
when the transaction must exhibit its anticompetitive ef-
fect.' Justice Brennan concluded that the appropriate point
in time to examine a section 7 claim is the time of suit, rather
than the time of actual acquisition."6  Justice Burton dis-
116. Id. at 588, 588 n.5.
117. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235, 334-
35 (D.C. Ill. 1954), rev'd353 U.S. 586 (1957).
118. Id.
119. See id.; see also EL. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 597-98.
120. See E.I du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 598.
121. Id. at 586.
122. Id. at 607-09.
123. Id. at 588 n.5.
124. Id. at 609-10 (Burton, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 589. The decision also was important because it concluded that
section 7 encompassed vertical relationships, not simply horizontal acquisitions.
Id. at 590. Additionally, Justice Brennan decided, on a minimal factual record,
that the relevant market included automotive finishes and fabrics, rejecting the
parties' contention that the market included all finishes and fabrics. Id. at 593-
95.
126. EL du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 597-98.
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agreed.127
Justice Brennan framed the issues in his opening para-
graph, positing that:
The primary issue is whether du Pont's commanding posi-
tion as General Motors' supplier of automotive finishes
and fabrics was achieved on competitive merit alone, or
because its acquisition of the General Motors' stock, and
the consequent close intercompany relationship, led to the
insulation of most of the General Motors' market from free
competition, with the resultant likelihood, at the time of
suit, of the creation of a monopoly of a line of commerce.
12 8
Before du Pont, only one lower court, in Transamerica
Corp. v. Board of Governors,"9 had expressly determined at
what point in time the government could challenge an al-
ready closed merger, and when the merger had to present
anticompetitive effects.' Agreeing with the Transamerica
decision, the du Pont Court concluded that under section 7, a
transaction that seemingly raised no competitive concerns at
the time of its consummation can nonetheless be unwound
pursuant to section 7 if, at some later point in time, the gov-
ernment concludes that there is a possibility that at that later
time it raises competitive concerns.
The Court reasoned that:
Section 7 is designed to arrest in its incipiency not only
the substantial lessening of competition from the acquisi-
tion by one corporation of the whole or any part of the
stock of a competing corporation, but also to arrest in their
incipiency restraints or monopolies in a relevant market
which, as a reasonable probability, appear at the time of
suit likely to result from the acquisition by one corporation
of all or any part of the stock of any other corporation.'32
To support his conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on
highly ambiguous legislative history.' A passage from the
Senate Report of the Clayton Act stated that the statute was
intended to "arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and
127. Id. at 609-10 (Burton, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 588-89 (emphasis added).
129. Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953).
130. See id. at 166.
131. E.I du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 597-98.
132. Id. at 589.
133. Id.
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monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation. 1 34
Justice Brennan concluded that "'[i]ncipiency' in this context
denotes not the time the stock was acquired, but any time
when the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited ef-
fect."3 ' Thus, "the Government may proceed at any time that
an acquisition may be said with reasonable probability to con-
tain a threat that it may lead to a restraint of commerce...
,,136
Armed with that conclusion, the Court explored the de-
veloping relationship between du Pont and GM, highlighting
that over time du Pont gained significant traction in GM's
business, ultimately securing a large portion of the latter's
finish and fabric businesses. 137 At the time the government
brought suit, the increased influence over GM's business was
the "incipient" violation of section 7, regardless of the fact
that at the time of the acquisition, the du Pont/GM relation-
ship did not represent a concern under the Clayton Act.
18
The Court ordered the stock divested to remedy the competi-
tive problem.
19
Justice Burton wrote a vigorous dissent, claiming that
the Court's interpretation of section 7 would "subject a good-
faith stock acquisition, lawful when made, to the hazard that
the continued holding of the stock may make the acquisition
illegal through unforeseen developments."4 ' Primarily con-
cerned that such a conclusion would "violate[] elementary
principles of fairness," Justice Burton predicted that:
The result is that unexpected and unforeseeable develop-
ments occurring long after a stock acquisition can be used
to challenge the legality of continued holding of the stock.
In such an action, the Government need only prove that
134. S. REP. No. 698, at 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914); see also E.I. du
Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 589.
135. E.I du Pont deNemours, 353 U.S. at 597.
136. Id. As discussed in Part II.B, supra, there was no contemplation in the
Clayton Act debates that the regime that Justice Brennan articulated would be
the rule. Given that in the forty years between the Clayton Act's enactment and
du Pont no one had considered bringing such a suit, it seems unlikely that Con-
gress considered Justice Brennan's reasoning to be the rule.
137. See id. at 586. One must wonder why, after concluding that the rela-
tionship was so "cozy," the Court did not choose to find that the transaction rep-
resented illegal collusion in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
138. See id at 589.
139. See id. at 607-08.
140. Id. at 622 (Burton, J., dissenting).
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probable rather than actual anticompetitive effects exist
as of the time of suit. The Government may thus set aside
a transaction which was entirely lawful when made,
merely by showing that it would have been unlawful had
it occurred at the time of suit, many years later. The
growth of the acquired corporation, a fortuitous decline in
the number of its competitors, or the achievement of con-
trol by an accidental diffusion of other stock may result,
under this test, in rendering the originally lawful acquisi-
tion unlawful ab initio.4 '
As did the majority, Justice Burton relied on the lan-
guage of the statute and its legislative history to reach his
conclusion. First, Justice Burton noted that section 7 forbids
acquisitions where the effect of such "acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition."' Thus, according to the
dissent, it is the acquisition and not the subsequent holding
that must be judged under the Act.' Justice Burton ac-
knowledged that the government could bring suit under sec-
tion 7 at any time, but if it brought suit challenging a merger
that had closed years before the challenge, the government
must prove that at the time of the acquisition (rather than at
the time of the suit), the transaction likely raised competitive
problems.'" Justice Burton reasoned that "[t]he offense de-
scribed by [section] 7 is the acquisition, not the holding or the
use, of stock. When the acquisition has been made, the of-
fense, if any, is complete. . . not at some later date to be arbi-
trarily chosen by the Government in bringing suit.""'
According to the dissent, "[tlhe Clayton Act was not in-
tended to replace the Sherman Act in remedying actual re-
straints and monopolies. Its purpose was to supplement the
Sherman Act by checking anticompetitive tendencies in their
incipiency, before they reached the point at which the
Sherman Act comes into play.""4 Under Justice Burton's in-
terpretation, the government's burden to challenge consum-
mated mergers would be substantially different than the bur-
den set forth in the majority opinion. Rather than providing
141. E.I du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 622-23 (Burton, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 612 (Burton, J., dissenting) (citing section 7 of the Clayton Act)
(emphasis added).
143. Id. at 622 (Burton, J. dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 620 (Burton, J. dissenting).
146. Id. at 621 (Burton, J. dissenting).
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the government with the opportunity to review a transaction
by relying on market conditions and the transaction's effect at
the time of the suit, Justice Burton would have required the
government to either (1) challenge a transaction under the
Clayton Act, using the time of acquisition as the reference
point in which to judge the probable effects of the transaction,
or (2) challenge a transaction under the Sherman Act, if the
challenge was brought following its close, and the agencies
rely on evidence of market conditions at the time of the suit
(rather than at the time of acquisition).147 Thus, according to
Justice Burton, the government in the latter circumstance
would have to demonstrate that the merger or acquisition
was an unreasonable restraint of trade, and that the deal
caused actual anticompetitive effects.
148
2. An Analysis of the du Pont Rule
The du Pont decision attracted rigorous debate in the
year following the Court's opinion. Many feared that the de-
cision would chill benign, efficiency-enhancing mergers.'49 In
a 1958 article, Bruce Bromley noted that:
The decision might seem to mean that if a purchaser buys
the assets or all of the stock of a company representing an
insubstantial factor in the market and the acquired assets
or the company are subsequently expanded so as to repre-
sent a substantial market share, the acquisition, then, be-
comes subject to successful attack.' 5°
Bromley found this to be an implausible rule.' To so
conclude would ignore that "the substantial share largely re-
flects not the effect of the merger but rather internal growth
which, all will agree, section 7 does not apply. The causal
connection between the merger and the presumed ill effect is
largely missing."'52 Bromley's conclusion and Burton's dissent
147. EL duPont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 612 (Burton, J. dissenting).
148. Id. at 622 (Burton, J. dissenting). This would make post-close chal-
lenges more difficult. The government has not successfully challenged a trans-
action under section 2 of the Sherman Act, nor has a private party. See discus-
sion supra Part II.A.
149. Eg, John C. Stedman, The Merger Statute: Sleeping Giant or Sleeping
Beauty, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 567, 568 (1957).
150. Bruce Bromley, Business View of the du Pont General Motors Decision,
46 GEO. L.J. 646, 651 (1958).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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were correct: the du Pont decision did not open the floodgates
of challenge to transactions that had closed years or decades
earlier. "' The DOJ wisely recognized that to do so would
cause chaos in the business community."'5 Thus, following the
decision, the DOJ attempted "to calm the fears of business
concerns understandably upset by the decision and fearful of
an attempt to exploit the breakthrough [decision].' 55
The du Pont regime raises significant issues. Where two
companies combine completely and merge their operations, a
post-close antitrust review that examines the transaction's
potential effects at the time the agency brings suit, rather
than at the time of acquisition, raises a concern about
whether alleged competitive problems were caused by the ac-
quisition or instead by extraneous changes in the structure of
the market.'56 In today's economy, especially in high-tech in-
dustries, market definitions change rapidly, and market
power often is transitory and unpredictable. Market forces
unrelated to the transaction-including subsequent entry,
exit, and change in consumer demand-may instead be the
cause of market power for a company that also happened to
acquire one of its competitors. Thus, a company without
market power at the time of an acquisition may be able in the
future to exert market power for reasons unrelated to a
transaction.
In such instances, the law should not permit the govern-
ment to rely upon market forces at the time of suit to chal-
lenge the transaction. If at the time of the deal the transac-
tion does not raise incipient competitive concerns and market
power only manifests itself in the future, during a subsequent
challenge, it would be nearly impossible to assign causation of
the alleged anticompetitive effect to the merger rather than to
a changing competitive environment.157 In such instances, the
parties should not be punished retroactively for success sim-
ply because earlier they combined their operations in the ab-
sence of any monopolistic or predatory behavior. Just as the
antitrust laws do not punish organic growth that results in
153. See Stedman, supra note 149, at 568.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See discussion infra Part IILB (discussing the role of post-acquisition
evidence in consummated merger review).
157. See Bromley, supra note 150, at 651.
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market power if such market power is not used anticompeti-
tively,158 section 7 should not punish merging parties that en-
gage in transactions that do not raise concerns under section
7 at the time they were consummated. Instead, if the gov-
ernment intends to challenge such a transaction at a later
date based on conditions at the time of suit and not at the
time the transaction closed, it must demonstrate actual anti-
competitive effects and bring a claim under section 2 of the
Sherman Act.'59
In addition, even if the causation issue can be resolved,
the agencies and the courts must also determine whether
such effects on the market were a probable consequence at
the time of acquisition and not simply a reality at the time of
suit. The following question may arise: if an industry power-
house acquires a small intellectual property shop with an ex-
tensive, but not yet market-relevant patent portfolio, and in
five years the combination of a patent in that portfolio with
the portfolio of the acquiring company creates blocking issues
inhibiting other competitors, is that transaction susceptible to
a section 7 challenge under the time-of-suit theory, even if no
such competitive concerns existed at the time of the transac-
tion's consummation? As Phil Neal noted, section 7 deals
with probabilities, not certainties:
[E]ven if the causal connection between an acquisition and
the impairment of competition can be taken as estab-
lished, there is a further theoretical objection to use of
post-acquisition evidence. This is simply that the occur-
rence of an event proves nothing about the probability
that it would happen .... If competition declines follow-
ing an acquisition, and the decline can be said to have
been caused by the acquisition, this proves only that such
a sequence of events was possible. It does not prove, or
tend to prove, that the event was probable or likely.
160
In the hypothetical posed above, if at the time of the
transaction the likelihood that the acquired company's patent
would ripen into blocking technology was a 100-to-1 possibil-
ity, should the odds playing out in favor of the acquiring party
result in a section 7 challenge when the competitive problem
158. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
160. See Phil Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L.
REV. 179, 224-25 (1952-53).
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presents itself? Under the du Pont Court's time-of-suit ra-
tionale, such a challenge would seem appropriate. Justice
Brennan would likely conclude that the relevant incipient
competitive problem became obvious at the time of suit and
was susceptible to challenge under section 7, even though
possibly at the time of the acquisition such competitive prob-
lems were not considered probable or even likely. This result
seems incorrect, inconsistent with the purpose of section 7,
and antithetical to the public policy of ensuring consistency
and predictability in business dealings. In such an instance,
the agencies or the courts should use section 2 of the
Sherman Act to remedy a competitive problem and should be
required to demonstrate actual competitive harm, not merely
the likelihood of such harm. 6'
Although du Pont is still good law, it is highly likely that
Justice Burton's dissent may resonate with a majority of to-
day's Supreme Court. Even the 1957 Court might have ruled
differently if the facts of du Pont were not so unique: the gov-
ernment challenged du Pont's acquisition of only a portion of
the voting securities of GM.'62 Thus, it was easy for the Court
to analyze the effects of the holding of those voting securities
at the time of suit, and it was easy to order divestiture, as
there had been no commingling of the parties' assets.'63
161. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
162. See E.I du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 588.
163. One fundamental question is whether Justice Brennan's du Pont deci-
sion renders the Sherman Act irrelevant when addressing the harm of mergers.
The Clayton Act already provides the antitrust agencies and the courts with the
benefit of ex ante review of potentially problematic transactions (i.e., with its
focus on probabilities, not certainties). With the du Pont decision, however,
Justice Brennan also allowed for ex post review of such transactions when con-
venient, without having to demonstrate actual competitive harm. At one time,
the FTC raised this as a fundamental issue in post-close merger analysis: where
post-acquisition conduct is a basis for the government's claim, is the Clayton Act
the appropriate vehicle to challenge the combination? As the Commission once
noted:
To isolate, in a complex business and economic environment, the
various causal strands that may contribute to particular effects is,
however, a difficult and indeed often impossible task. For that rea-
son, there is little point in utilizing section 7 where an actual re-
straint of trade has occurred subsequent to the acquisition. It is
more appropriate in such a case to attack under Sherman or Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act principles a respondent's total course of
conduct, including its acquisitions, rather than challenge simply
the acquisitions themselves and attempt to use the other elements
of the respondent's conduct as evidence of the competitive effects of
CLAYTONACT
B. Role of Post-Acquisition Evidence
The Court's holding in du Pont--specifically that the ap-
propriate point in time to analyze the potential effect of con-
summated transactions under section 7 is at the time of
suit-raised a host of concerns about the probative value of
post-acquisition evidence in a section 7 proceeding. As a re-
sult of the du Pont decision, courts were forced to grapple
with the issue of what weight to ascribe to evidence of market
effects that manifest during the period of time between the
close of the transaction and the time a lawsuit was brought
challenging that transaction."M In other words, courts were
required to consider the extent to which such post-merger
evidence is relevant and, therefore, admissible.
Case law in the wake of duz Pont permits both parties to
rely on post-acquisition evidence to the extent that it demon-
strates either that a transaction raises incipient competitive
problems or that the structure of a post-acquisition market
inhibits the combined entity from exercising market power.165
When, where, and how much weight such evidence should be
afforded requires a case-by-case analysis: "applying the sec-
tion 7 tests becomes an exceedingly complex process when the
acquisition in question occurred long before the proceeding"'66
and a court determines whether the alleged anticompetitive
market condition "is in whole or in part an 'effect' of the ac-
quisition."167
Reliance on post-acquisition evidence raises significant
issues of evidentiary standards for both the government and
the acquisitions.
In re Ekco Prod. Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1211 (1964). The Ekco Products decision
introduces an interesting issue: where the government seeks to rely on evidence
of post-acquisition anticompetitive behavior as the basis of its claim, it can do
so, but should it not instead utilize the Sherman Act as its vehicle to challenge a
transaction? The argument goes that although section 7 can be used to bring
post-consummation challenges, the government should rely on market condi-
tions at the time of the merger to make its case under this predictive statute; to
the extent that the government would rather rest its case upon demonstrating
actual competitive harm, it should instead use the monopolization prohibition of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
164. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); E.. du
Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586; Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974);
Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592.
166. Neal, supra note 160, at 223.
167. Id. at 225.
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the merging parties. To the extent that the government relies
on post-acquisition evidence to make its case that a transac-
tion is anticompetitive, it must be able to demonstrate that
post-close anticompetitive behavior was enabled by the trans-
action and not by external market dynamics unrelated to the
merger (i.e., that such evidence is relevant to the claim that
the merger caused competitive harm).' On the other hand,
merging parties cannot simply rely on the non-occurrence of
competitive harm after an acquisition's close to establish con-
clusively that a merger is free from section 7 concerns.6 9 The
non-existence of such evidence could simply result from the
company's conscious decision to forestall raising prices, reduc-
ing output, or affecting innovation while the government is
reviewing the merger (i.e., such evidence may have little pro-
bative value).170 Later when the attention of the government
is turned away from the transaction, that entity could then
engage in anticompetitive practices.'17  Next, this article
traces the evolution of Supreme Court case law relevant to
this issue, discusses the lower courts' application of that law,
and concludes with an analysis of the role post-acquisition
evidence should play in future challenges.
1. Evolution of Supreme Court Case Law
The role of post-acquisition evidence in merger challenges
evolved over the course of several decades of Supreme Court
opinions, starting with the decision in du Pont.17 In du Pont,
the Supreme Court relied heavily on post-acquisition evidence
to support its holding that the relationship between du Pont
and GM represented an incipient violation of the antitrust
laws. 173 The Supreme Court concluded that post-acquisition
evidence tended to prove that the stock relationship between
du Pont and GM enabled competitive harm, specifically hold-
ing that du Pont used its stock position to gain favorable con-
tracts with GM.7" After du Pont, it appeared that the gov-
ernment would be able to rely upon post-acquisition events as
168. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486; Consol. Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592.
169. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 577.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See E.I duPontdeNemours, 353 U.S. at 597-98.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 606.
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nearly conclusive, probative evidence of whether a closed
transaction raised competitive concerns. During the subse-
quent decade, the Court refined the du Pont rule by raising
evidentiary barriers, thus limiting the cases in which the par-
ties in merger litigation can rely on ex post evidence to sup-
port an incipiency challenge.'75
Following du Pont, the Supreme Court decided FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp. ("Consolidated Foods"),76 which, al-
though professing to follow the du Pont reasoning, confused
the rule about the role of post-acquisition evidence in section
7 claims.' In Consolidated Foods, the Court reviewed a
merger that had closed thirteen years prior to the FTC bring-
ing suit to unwind it.18 The court of appeals relied almost ex-
clusively on post-acquisition evidence to conclude that the
merger did not raise competitive problems. 9 Citing the lack
of substantial changes in market structure and the absence of
competitive harm after close (e.g., no price increases), the
lower court held that evidence demonstrating the non occur-
rence of anticompetitive effects after the close of the transac-
tion was sufficient to negate an alleged violation of section
7.180
The Supreme Court disagreed.' In a somewhat convo-
luted opinion, the Court first held that the court of appeals
gave too much weight to the post-acquisition evidence in the
case. 182  The court reasoned that "[p]robability of the pro-
scribed evil is required .... If the post-acquisition evidence
were given conclusive weight or allowed to override all prob-
abilities, then acquisitions would go forward willy-nilly, the
parties biding their time" until the regulators stopped look-
ing."' After the regulators turned their collective attention
from the review of the transaction, the Supreme Court as-
sumed, that firm would be free to act anticompetitively.'"
175. See discussion of United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974), infra pp. 72-74.
176. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592.
177. Id.; see also United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
178. Consol. Foods Cop., 380 U.S. at 593.
179. Id. at 598.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Conso]. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. at 598. One must truly wonder whether
the Supreme Court's concerns are as substantial as they suggest. If the concern
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However, after chastising the court of appeals for relying
too heavily on post-acquisition evidence to reach its decision,
the Supreme Court itself re-examined the post-close evidence
in the record and concluded that, in fact, "the post-acquisition
evidence... tend[ed] to confirm, rather than cast doubt upon,
the probable anticompetitive effect" of the merger.'85 The
Court then went on to describe, in great detail, the post-
merger competitive problems that followed the close of the
transaction, concluding that such evidence demonstrated a
violation of section 7.186
Adding further confusion to the role and weight of post-
acquisition evidence, Justice Stewart's concurrence advocated
for more express reliance on such evidence in section 7
cases.8 7 Post-acquisition evidence, reasoned Justice Stewart,
is "the best evidence available to determine whether the
merger will distort market forces in [an] industry." 8 The
holding in Consolidated Foods appeared to follow the du Pont
rule in that the government can rely on post-acquisition evi-
dence of anticompetitive effects in the market to establish a
violation, while, on the other hand, suggested that the merg-
ing parties cannot cite the lack of competitive harm after the
acquisition's close to rebut the government's case.'89
Two years later, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,'9° the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit's decision holding that the government failed to meet
its section 7 burden when it challenged the merger between
Procter & Gamble ("P&G") and Clorox. 9' In 1957, P&G ac-
quired Clorox; the combination integrated two companies that
did not compete but offered complementary products (P&G of-
fered a range of household products; Clorox was the leading
liquid bleach manufacturer).'92 The Court held that P&G's
is truly that once a merger closes and the agencies conclude their review under
the Clayton Act that the combined entity acts anticompetitively, the govern-
ment can certainly challenge the conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2.
185. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. at 598.
186. See id. at 598-601.
187. See id. at 605-06 (Stewart, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 606 (Stewart, J., concurring).
189. See EL. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586; see also Consol. Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592.
190. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
191. Id. at 570.
192. See id. at 570-73.
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acquisition of Clorox "may substantially reduce the competi-
tive structure of the [liquid bleach] industry by raising entry
barriers" and by eliminating "potential competition" between
P&G and Clorox.'93 In the eyes of the Court, the industry al-
ready was oligopolistic; P&G's acquisition of Clorox would in-
hibit smaller firms from competing because given P&G's
market dominance it would be substantially easier for P&G
than for smaller competitors to build the Clorox brand.1
4
Also, P&G had access to a strong distribution network that
would disadvantage smaller rivals.'95
P&G argued that there was no evidence that the com-
pany had engaged in any anticompetitive practices in the
nine years after the merger closed: prices had not increased,
and P&G was unable to increase its market share for four
years (despite its access to a greater advertising budget and
stronger distribution channels).'96 The Court disagreed, dis-
counting the fact that the government could not produce evi-
dence demonstrating post-acquisition harm.'97
Although Justice Harlan concurred, he viewed differently
the utility and probative value of post-acquisition evidence in
a section 7 case. 98 He concluded that "[t]he value of post-
merger evidence seems more than offset by the difficulties en-
countered in obtaining it."'99 He believed that post-acquisition
evidence had little relevance in a section 7 analysis irrespec-
tive of which party proffered it. Justice Harlan reasoned
that:
[D]ependence on post-merger evidence would allow con-
trols to be evaded by the dissimulation of market power
during the period of observation. For example, Procter
had been aware of the [section] 7 challenge almost from
the date of the merger, and it would be unrealistic, so rea-
soned the Commission, to assume that market power
would be used adversely to competition during the pend-
ency of the proceeding.
200
Likewise, Harlan believed that courts should afford little
193. Id. at 578.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 574.
196. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 576-77.
197. Id. at 576.
198. Id. at 593 (Harlan, J., concurring).
199. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 591-92 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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weight to post-merger evidence tending to demonstrate sub-
sequent anticompetitive behavior, concluding that "post-
merger evidence [is] generally irrelevant and proper only in
the unusual case in which the structure of the market has
changed radically since the merger .... Market structure
changes, rather than evidence of market behavior, were held
to be the key to a [section] 7 analysis."' ' Justice Harlan
noted that "the need for businessmen to be able to make at
least some predictions as to the legality of their actions when
formulating future market plans" militated against the use of
post-acquisition evidence in analyzing mergers.2 2 Allowing
the government to rely on changes in post-close behavior as a
basis to challenge mergers potentially could chill the market,
making it less likely that businesses would engage in merger
activity with knowledge that the government would monitor
their behavior following close. °3
The Court adopted Justice Harlan's position in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.2 In that case, the Court
held that evidence of the combined entity's inability to exer-
cise market power in the post-close market is probative to the
extent that it explains objectively the structure of the mar-
ket.20 5 To reach its decision that the competitive environment
in the coal industry had changed since the time of the acquisi-
tion of Material Service Corporation by United Electric, the
Supreme Court concluded that the district court appropri-
ately relied on post-acquisition evidence."6 Subsequent to the
acquisition's completion, the industry's market structure had
changed swiftly, lessening the competitive significance of the
combined entity's coal reserve.2 7 In addition, the market in-
fluence of coal suppliers diminished in the time following the
merger, with large utilities becoming the parties' major cus-
tomers and forcing coal suppliers to enter into long-term con-
tracts with terms highly favorable to the utilities (i.e., exhibit-
ing characteristics of a power buyer market). 208
The Court held that such post-acquisition evidence is in-
201. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
202. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 592-93 (Harlan, J., concurring).
203. See id.
204. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
205. Id. at 506.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 498-501.
208. Id. at 500.
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deed probative of the combined firm's power to influence the
market, because such conditions were beyond the control of
the parties:
Such evidence could not reflect a positive decision on the
part of the merger companies to deliberately but tempo-
rarily refrain from anticompetitive actions, nor could it
reasonably be thought to reflect less active competition
than that which might have occurred had there not been
an acquisition in 1959. As the District Court convincingly
found, the trend toward increased dependence on utilities
as consumers of coal and toward the near-exclusive use of
long-term contracts was the product of inevitable pres-
sures on the coal industry in all parts of the country. And,
unlike evidence showing only that no lessening of competi-
tion has yet occurred, the demonstration of weak coal re-
sources necessarily and logically implied that United Elec-
tric was not merely disinclined but unable to compete
209
effectively for future contracts.
Thus, in General Dynamics, the Court clearly retreated
from the rules set forth in Consolidated Foods and du Pont,
holding that the government cannot argue that evidence of
post-merger competitive harm was probative in a section 7
claim, while at the same time denying the parties the oppor-
tunity to rely upon such evidence to demonstrate that the
merger was benign:
[T]he 'time of suit rule' coupled with the limited weight
given to post-merger evidence of no anticompetitive im-
pact tends to give the Government a 'heads-I-win, tails-
you-lose' advantage over a [section] 7 defendant: post-
merger evidence showing a lessening of competition may
constitute an 'incipiency' on which to base a divestiture
suit, but evidence showing that such lessening has not, in
fact, occurred cannot be accorded 'too much weight.'
210
General Dynamics was the last Supreme Court case to
consider fully the issue of the role of post-acquisition evidence
in merger analysis. Congress passed the HSR Act less than
two years later, substantially reducing the number of post-
close challenges. 1 As a result, only a few lower court deci-
sions have considered the appropriate role of post-acquisition
209. Id. at 506.
210. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at505 n.13.
211. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
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evidence since the enactment of the HSR Act.212
2. Lower Court Opinions
The primary decisions following General Dynamics have
adhered to the reasoning of that case closely. In 1991, a dis-
trict court in the Eighth Circuit decided the United States v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. ("ADM')2 13 case, conforming to
the general principles set forth in General Dynamics. In
ADM, the court concluded that to the extent that the parties
intend to rely on evidence about the post-close market, and
the market exhibits "significant factors that are not, and can-
not be, controlled by defendants," reliance on such evidence is
legitimate. 14 In ADM, the court could properly rely on post-
acquisition evidence because the events could not be "manipu-
lated by ADM and other HFCS [High Fructose Corn Syrup]
producers because of the pendency of this suit."
21 5
The court exclusively relied upon evidence concerning the
post-close market structure and ignored the behavioral evi-
dence (i.e., evidence of price increases or output reductions)
proffered by the parties.2 6 It examined the nature of pricing
in the relevant industry (HFCS pricing was kept secret),2 7 the
negotiation power of the buyers (the buyers, like Coca-Cola,
were traditional "power buyers" with significant ability to
control suppliers like ADM), 28 and the frequency and magni-
tude of transactions (infrequent and large). 29  Based upon
that record, the court concluded that after the acquisition, the
combined entity did not have the power to influence pricing.22°
The ADMdecision followed closely the General Dynamics rule
that only market structure and not the parties' behavior can
be admitted as evidence.
United States v. Syufy Enterprises ("Syufy'), a 1990 deci-
sion by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, also relied exclu-
212. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Iowa
1991).
213. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400.
214. Id. at 1422.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 1422-23.
217. Idat 1416.
218. Id. at 1418-20.
219. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. at 1422-23.
220. Id. at 1423.
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sively upon post-acquisition evidence to deny a post-close
challenge under section 7.221 Syufy involved a series of acqui-
sitions by a movie theater complex owner resulting in the ac-
quisition of 100 percent of all first-run movie theaters in Las
Vegas, Nevada."22 In concluding that the series of transac-
tions raised no concerns under section 7, the court set forth
what it reasoned were conclusive facts based on the market
structure rather than the behavior of Syufy. According to the
court, immediately following Syufy's acquisition, a major
movie distributor entered the market and captured more than
fifty percent of the market within only a few years, demon-
strating that Syufy did not have long-term market power be-
cause its market share declined so rapidly.23
As the court in ADM, the Syufy court relied on post-
acquisition market structure-rather than on post-acquisition
behavior-to conclude that a transaction did not raise com-
224petitive concerns.
3. Observations Concerning the Appropriate Role of
Post-Acquisition Evidence
The government, the merging parties, and the courts may
be tempted to rely on post-acquisition evidence to make their
respective cases under section 7. Thus, where competition
has declined significantly, the government will point to this
as conclusively establishing that a transaction was anticom-
petitive and harmful to the market.22 On the other hand,
merging parties will argue that, after the transaction, prices
have not increased or innovation has remained robust in sup-
port that the merger did not affect competition.226
Post-acquisition evidence is often obvious (e.g., prices
have gone up following a merger), but at the same time, it can
221. SyufrEnters., 903 F.2d 659.
222. Id. at 662.
223. Id. at 665.
224. See id. at 664, 666-67. Syufy and ADM also reflect the changing nature
of merger analysis. The courts, following General Dynamics, began to analyze
transactions and their effects more thoroughly. Rather than concluding that
increased concentration meant that a merger was anticompetitive, the courts
instead looked beyond concentration statistics to consider whether a concentra-
tion contributed to a company's ability to exercise market power and whether
the merger would harm consumer welfare. See discussion supra note 71.
225. See Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 576-77.
226. See id.
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be problematic for several reasons. The mere occurrence or
non-occurrence of an event does little to demonstrate causa-
tion.'27 Even if the issue of causation can be resolved, a more
fundamental question remains: what are the consequences if
the acquisition was the cause of anticompetitive behavior?
Section 7 is a predictive statute and only acquisitions with
probable adverse effects on competition should fall within the
ambit of the statute.228 Solely because an effect looking like
anticompetitive behavior occurred does not mean that it was
initially, ex ante, likely to happen or predictable at the time
of the merger. Thus, the relevance of post-acquisition evi-
dence is minimal, unless the government can demonstrate
that post-close events were more than just a fortuitous result
of a transaction that was unlikely to lessen competition.229
As Justice Harlan noted in his Procter & Gamble, Co.
concurrence, section 7 demands a predictive, rather than a
retrospective, analysis.23 ° To maintain stability in markets,
businesses must "be able to make at least some predictions as
to the legality of their actions when formulating future mar-
ket plans."231 As a former chairman of the FTC stated:
Conditional clearance of mergers pending postmerger de-
velopments is anathema to American antitrust because of
both the market effects of this approach and the institu-
tional arrangements in this country for review of mergers.
As to market effects, there are many problems with reli-
ance on postmerger evidence and forceful reasons why a
transaction should not become illegal on the bases of
postacquisition evidence. Some facts that could be devel-
oped after the merger are unreliable because they are
within the control of the merging parties. For example,
the fact that prices did not increase in the market after
the merger may only reflect the fact that the combined
company decided to forego price increases for a while-
until the government stopped watching. Also, some things
that might happen shortly after a merger-for example,
the exit from the market of rival firms-would have been
unpredictable at the time the transaction was entered into
227. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
228. See Brown Shoe Co., 386 U.S. at 317-18.
229. See infra note 232 for further discussion of the appropriateness of such
post-close evidence.
230. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 584, 599.
231. Id. at 592.
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and therefore unfair to charge against the interests of the
merging parties. Finally, it would be counterproductive
from the point of view of antitrust policy to discourage
companies from taking procompetitive actions after the
merger, out of fear that the companies would thereby con-
vert what was legal to an illegal transaction.232
Case law concerning the admissibility and probative
value of post-acquisition evidence was developed in an era
when merger analysis was quite different. Since the mid-
1970s, the antitrust agencies' analysis of whether mergers
raise competitive problems has changed significantly. In
cases decided during the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court
was willing to consider even a minimal delta in the Hircsh-
Herfendahl Index ("HHI")233 as a sign of an incipient competi-
tive problem.2 4  Just as the courts in the 1950s and 1960s
simply relied on changes in market concentration to find a
section 7 violation, so did those courts reflexively consider
post-close evidence, including subsequent price or market
share increases, as near conclusive evidence that a merger
232. Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforce-
ment in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L. J. 195, 223-24 (1992). Former Chairman
Pitofsky's rationale echoes a Harvard Law Review comment published thirty
years earlier:
[W]hen the acquirer engages in post-acquisition predatory pricing of
the product of the acquired company, it may seem easier and more ap-
propriate to invalidate the merger at that point, but the proposition is
not without difficulties. In the first place, problems are raised as to the
relevance of post-acquisition evidence and the date as of which the le-
gality of an acquisition is to be tested. If a merger would have been
upheld at any time up to the occasion of predatory pricing, this is the
equivalent of saying, from a legal standpoint, that expansion by acqui-
sition was no more objectionable than expansion by building. If a com-
pany expanded by building and then indulged in predatory pricing, it
would not be subject to a rule of automatic divestiture. There seems
little more reason to apply such a rule when growth came by an other-
wise unobjectionable acquisition. In either event, a section 2 Sherman
Act proceeding against the firm for predatory pricing would permit di-
vestiture when it was appropriate or necessary for the restoration of
competitive conditions. There does not seem to be a good case for
abandoning such flexibility in favor of an automatic rule.
Donald F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1347 (1965).
233. HHI is the standard index used to measure the concentration in a mar-
ket, and is calculated by summing the squares of the parties' market shares.
234. See 1 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 333 (Debra J. Pearlstein, ed., 5th ed. 2002) (stating "[t]he
early cases applying Section 7 interpreted the provision to prohibit even small
increases in concentration in relatively unconcentrated markets").
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presented a competitive problem.235
The law as it stands in 2004 suggests that the role of
post-acquisition evidence ascribed by courts in the 1950s and
1960s is outdated. Since the early 1990s, merger review is
largely guided by the Chicago School inspired 1992 Horizon-
tal Merger Guidelines ("1992 Merger Guideline")..36 Under
the 1992 Merger Guidelines, courts and the antitrust agen-
cies undertake a more rigorous analysis into a merger's ef-
fects on a market, rather than simply and reflexively looking
at market concentration measured by HHI deltas when decid-
ing whether a merger raises a section 7 problem.237 In de-
termining whether a transaction likely violates section 7, the
antitrust agencies examine the entire structure of a market,
focusing on whether its characteristics post-close would facili-
tate anticompetitive behavior.
Likewise, when considering post-acquisition evidence in a
challenge to a closed merger, the courts and antitrust agen-
cies cannot solely rely on evidence that following a merger,
prices have increased, that the pace of innovation has slowed,
or that output has decreased, to attribute anticompetitive ef-
fects to a merger.2 9 Instead, to the extent that a court consid-
ers post-acquisition evidence in its section 7 review of con-
summated mergers, the scope of admissible evidence must be
extremely narrow and demonstrate that (1) any alleged anti-
competitive effects are caused by a merger, rather than by
subsequent and unrelated changes in the market, and
(2) such effects are not merely short-term, transitory con-
cerns. Below, this article highlights some of the pertinent
categories of post-acquisition evidence and discusses how
courts and antitrust agencies should use such evidence to
support or rebut a claim that a merger caused a competitive
problem.
Entry Evidence. Both the government and the merging
235. See, e.g., Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. at 592.
236. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1992
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines], at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizbook/toc.html. (revised April 8,
1997) (revising section 4 to address "Efficiencies") (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
237. Id. § 0.1-.2 (setting forth the "Purpose, Underlying Policy Assumptions
and Overview" of the 1992 Merger Guidelines).
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506
(1973).
Vol: 45
CLAYTONACT
parties should be able to rely upon post-acquisition evidence
of market entry to support their claims. As in Syufy, the
merged parties can use evidence of actual entry or demon-
strate that post-close entry by new competitors is "easy," to
support their claim that a closed merger could not harm com-
24petition. 4° Just as under the 1992 Merger Guidelines exam-
ples of recent entry support the conclusion that a merger does
not raise competitive problems, evidence of entry into a mar-
ket following the close of a merger should provide near-
conclusive evidence that a merger did not and could not ad-
versely affect market conditions." Where entry occurred, it
follows that the merged entity could not sustain a long-term
negative impact on the market. Of course, evidence of actual
entry should not be required. Where the merged parties can
demonstrate even in the absence of actual entry that hypo-
thetical entry would be timely, likely, and sufficient, such
evidence should also rebut a claim that a merger violates sec-
tion 7.242 On the other hand, the government cannot rely sim-
ply on the absence of entry as evidence that a merger raises a
competitive problem. After all, the merger could have created
efficiencies as well as a superior product.243 Instead, the gov-
ernment must demonstrate that such entry is not easy be-
cause the market would not support entry even if the com-
bined entity attempted to exercise market power.2 "
Pzice, Innovation, and Output Evidence. By itself, evi-
dence of a post-close change in price should not be sufficient
to show an anticompetitive effect, although under older case
law, such evidence often was the focus of a court's analysis.242
Instead of simply relying on evidence of such changes in price,
innovation or output, a fact-finder must determine the rea-
sons behind them. Even though proof of bad acts, including
coordinated pricing, output reduction or decrease in the pace
of innovation, can support a claim of market power, this evi-
240. See SyufyEnters., 903 F.2d at 664-66.
241. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 236 at § 3. Evidence of actual
entry would, of course, demonstrate that the merged entity could not sustain an
increase in price, as additional firms would find it profitable to enter and charge
less than the combined entity, driving prices back down to a pre-merger com-
petitive level. Id.
242. See id.
243. See id. § 4.
244. See id.
245. See, e.g., Consol. Foods. Corp., 380 U.S. at 598.
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dence alone is not probative without further indication that
(1) the market cannot defeat such bad acts in the long-term,
and (2) the merger facilitated such bad acts (i.e., the "causa-
tion" issue).24' Bad acts alone do not demonstrate that a
merger caused competitive imbalance.
Evidence About Efficiencies. Older case law was devel-
oped at a time when efficiencies had no role in section 7
merger analysis.2 47 Today, the situation is different. Under
the Merger Guidelines, the agencies and the courts must con-
sider evidence of merger-specific efficiencies in determining
whether a combination violates section 7.245
Thus, in a post-close challenge, the parties also must be
able to introduce evidence that the merger resulted in cost
savings, increased ability to develop products, better distribu-
tion, or ability to manufacture best-of-breed products using
the combined technologies of both parties.19  Although such
evidence by itself cannot save an otherwise anticompetitive
merger, it is probative in a post-close challenge under section
7.250
C. Appropriate Remedial Reach
The antitrust laws traditionally favor divestiture to rem-
edy an illegal merger's competitive concerns.25' Section 11(b)
of the Clayton Act provides that the FTC, if it finds a viola-
tion of section 7, shall "issue... an order requir-
ing [respondent] to cease and desist from such violations, and
246. See generally Syufy Enter., 903 F.2d at 665.
247. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963)
(holding that "the effect of [a merger] 'may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion'" in a market, it "is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social
or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial").
248. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 236, § 4 (revised in 1997 to in-
clude section 4 addressing the role of efficiencies in merger review analysis); see
also, e.g., United States v. Rakford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill.
1990); United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
249. See generally Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Eficien-
ties: Still Hostile After All These Years, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729 (1999) (dis-
cussing the 1992 and 1997 revisions to the guidelines and the way the courts
now consider efficiencies in competitive effects analysis).
250. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 236, § 4.
251. See, e.g., In re Ekco Prod. Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1217 (1964) (stating
"while divestiture is normally the appropriate remedy in a Section 7 proceeding,
on occasion it may possibly be impracticable or inadequate, or impose unjustifi-
able hardship - which underscores the importance of the Commission's having a
range of alternatives in its arsenal of remedies").
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divest itself of the stock, or other share capital, or assets...
,, 252 The Supreme Court recognized that even though divesti-
ture is "the most drastic" of available merger remedies, it
nevertheless is "the most effective" to restore pre-merger lev-
els of competition. 3 In Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
5 4
the Supreme Court held that section 7 "relief must be di-
rected to that which is 'necessary and appropriate in the pub-
lic interest to eliminate the effects of the acquisition offensive
to the statute' . . . or which will 'cure the ill effects of the ille-
gal conduct, and assure the public freedom from its continu-
ance."' 255 Moreover, relief must not be punitive but must be
designed to "redress the violations" and "to restore competi-
tion., 256 As explained by the Court in United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co.,257  "three dominant influences must guide"
the analysis of the appropriate remedy following a determina-
tion that the antitrust laws were violated:
1. The duty of giving complete and efficacious effect to the
prohibitions of the statute; 2, the accomplishing of this re-
sult with as little injury as possible to the interest of the
general public; and, 3, a proper regard for the vast inter-
ests of private property which may have become vested in
many persons as a result of the acquisition ....
Fashioning a divestiture package after the close of a
merger is difficult. Where two companies have combined
their business operations and have begun the process of as-
similating product lines, combining real estate, shedding du-
plicative manufacturing capabilities, or aggregating intellec-
tual property, a post-close order of divestiture may be
252. 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (2000).
253. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326
(1961).
254. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
255. Id. at 573 n.8 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
256. Id. at 573.
257. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
258. Id. at 185. Professor Areeda has stated:
[F]ederal antitrust has not commonly used dissolution [as opposed to
divestiture] as a remedy in simple merger cases, and it would certainly
be an excessive penalty for an unlawful acquisition and nothing more.
Rather, dissolution has generally been reserved for [section] 2 cases
breaking large firms up into several component parts whose pieces do
not reflect simple acquisitions that the firm had made in the recent
past.
4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA et al., ANTITRUST LAW 990c2, at 103 (1998) (cita-
tions omitted).
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difficult, costly, punitive to the business involved in the
merger, and, overall, detrimental to customers. Congress en-
acted the HSR Act to alleviate many of the problems associ-
ated with post-close divestitures.259
As a result, following the passage of the HSR Act, there
has been little opportunity to develop case law concerning the
appropriate scope of relief allowed in post-consummation
challenges because the HSR Act largely eliminated the need
to conduct post-close review. Next, this article discusses some
of the more prominent Commission and court decisions on the
topic of the appropriate scope of these older divestiture or-
ders, and then analyzes why this older case law is ill
equipped to accommodate post-consummation challenges in
261today's economy.
a. Historical Case Law Regarding Remedial Scope of
Section 7
1. In re Diamond Alkali Co.
261
In Diamond Alkali Co., the Commission forced an acquir-
ing company to completely exit a market in an attempt to re-
store the pre-acquisition competitive state of that market.262
The Commission concluded that Diamond Alkali should di-
vest the cement processing plant it had acquired from Besse-
mer Limestone and Cement Co. ("Bessemer")."3 Prior to this
acquisition, Diamond Alkali manufactured cement in two
plants.2' Following the Bessemer acquisition, Diamond Al-
kali discontinued cement production and dismantled the ma-
chinery at both of its internal plants because they had become
obsolete and inefficient.265 Thus, after the acquisition, Dia-
mond Alkali confined its manufacturing operations to the
Bessemer structures it had acquired.266
Immediately following the merger's close, the Commis-
sion issued a complaint challenging the transaction pursuant
259. H.R. REP No. 94-1373, at 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2637, 2643.
260. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
261. In re Diamond Alkali Co., 72 F.T.C. 700 (1967).
262. See id.
263. Id. at 740.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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to section 7 and alleging that the cement processing industry
had become too consolidated as a result of the Bessemer ac-
quisition.267  After finding a violation, the Commission was
confronted with the issue of how to devise a remedy, which
was difficult in light of the fact that Diamond Alkali had al-
ready dismantled its own internal competitive cement pro-
duction facilities. The Commission framed the issue as fol-
lows:
These facts present for consideration a novel question,
namely, having found a violation of amended Section 7, to
what extent can the Commission devise an effective rem-
edy; and what should that remedy be, where the acquiring
firm has divested itself of the preacquisition assets corre-
sponding to the particular assets whose acquisition gave
the merger its anticompetitive character. In short, what
can the Commission do when there is no longer in being
duplicate manufacturing facilities which upon an order of
divestiture could form the basis for two viable firms and
2681thus a restoration of competition.
Diamond Alkali contended that "ordering divestiture
would be penal and pointless since it would merely substitute
one competitor for another and that therefore it should be
permitted to retain the Bessemer assets."269 According to
Diamond Alkali, to order the divestiture of the Bessemer as-
sets on these facts would ultimately harm consumers, as it
would replace the Diamond Alkali/Bessemer combination of a
healthy company (Diamond Alkali) and state-of-the-art ce-
ment processing facilities (Bessemer) with an independent
Bessemer entity lacking the resources to effectively com-
pete.27° Diamond Alkali stated that it would exit the market
267. DiamondAlkali Co., 72 F.T.C. at 704-05.
268. Id. at 741. See also In re Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769 (1957),
afid, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961). In Crown Zellerbach, the Commission or-
dered the respondent to divest not only the assets it acquired as a result of the
acquisition of St. Helens Pulp & Paper Co., but also:
[Sbo much of the plant machinery, buildings, improvements, and
equipment of whatever description that has been installed or placed on
the premises of the St. Helens plant by respondent as may be necessary
to restore St. Helens Pulp & Paper Co. as a competitive entity in the
paper trade, as organized and in substantially the basic operating form
it existed at or around the time of the acquisition.
Id. at 808.
269. DiamondAlkali Co., 72 F.T.C. at 741.
270. See id.
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if the Commission ordered it to divest the Bessemer assets, as
the company did not have the ability to restart its internally
developed cement processing capabilities that it had shut
down following the Bessemer acquisition.27'
Remarkably, although it accepted Diamond Alkali's con-
tention, the Commission concluded that Diamond Alkali had
to divest the Bessemer plant despite the fact that doing so did
not restore a pre-acquisition competitive balance in the mar-
ket.272 The Commission recognized that "ordering divestiture
is a 'pig in a poke' because we know we have an effective
competitor now on the scene, and we have no guarantee that
anyone brought in as a substitute for Diamond Alkali would
measure up to its level of effectiveness.""27 Nevertheless, the
Commission concluded that Diamond Alkali would remain on
the fringe of the market-a potential competitor to Besse-
mer-following the divestiture of the Bessemer assets.274 In
the eyes of the Commission, having Bessemer in the market
and Diamond Alkali as a potential competitor was closer to
the pre-acquisition competitive state of the market, rather
than simply having Diamond Alkali control the Bessemer as-
sets. 275
Diamond Alkali demonstrates clearly the problematic na-
ture of post-close challenges. The Commission recognized
that its order was imperfect. 276 The Commission's opinion
went to great lengths to highlight that it pleaded with Dia-
mond Alkali to propose alternative relief that would restore
the pre-acquisition competitive balance in the market; Dia-
mond Alkali failed to do sO.277 Thus, according to the Com-
mission, it was left with the choice to either (1) do nothing
and allow the section 7 violation to continue, or (2) devise its
own remedy to alleviate the competitive concern.278 It chose
the latter alternative, while recognizing the decision's short-
comings.279
271. Id.
272. Id. at 746-47.
273. Id. at 747.
274. Id. at 749.
275. See DiamondAlkali Co., 72 F.T.C. at 749.
276. Id. at 743, 746-47.
277. Id. at 744-47.
278. Id. at 751.
279. Id.
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2. In re Ekco Products Co.280
Ekco further demonstrates the problems with the post-
close fashioning of relief. In Ekco, the Commission concluded
that a series of acquisitions by Ekco Products Co. ("Ekco") vio-
lated section 7 in the market for commercial meat-handling
equipment.28' Over the course of several years, Ekco had ac-
quired two sets of assets.282  In 1954, Ekco acquired
McClintock, which was the only company to manufacture
commercial meat-handling equipment at the time.283 Ekco
had no presence in the market.2' Following Ekco's
McClintock acquisition, Blackman entered the market, and
several years later, Ekco acquired Blackman's commercial
meat-handling equipment assets as well.285 The Commission
concluded that both transactions violated section 7 on a con-
glomerate theory (the McClintock acquisition provided Ekco
with a portfolio of assets in the commercial meat-handling
market that made it more difficult for others to compete) and
a horizontal theory (the Blackman assets directly competed
with Ekco's assets acquired from McClintock).2 6
The Commission noted that divestiture would be difficult
to order because (1) the McClintock assets had been commin-
gled with existing Ekco assets, and (2) Ekco had dissolved
completely the Blackman assets.287 Thus, the Commission de-
termined that it was impossible to restore the market to its
pre-acquisition condition and, instead, fashioned an alterna-
tive remedy to restore competition in the market.288  The
Commission ordered that (1) Ekco could not acquire another
company in the commercial meat-handling equipment market
for five years, and, more importantly, (2) Ekco would be re-
quired to divest itself of the McClintock assets.288 Much like
the order in Diamond Alkali, the Commission's order in Ekco
effectively took the acquiring company completely out of the
280. In reEcko Prod. Co., 65 F.T.C. 1204 (Apr. 21, 1964).
281. Id. at 1221 (finding a violation of section 7 and ordering additional pro-
ceedings for purposes of devising appropriate relief).
282. Id. at 1204-06.
283. Id. at 1204-05.
284. See id.
285. Id. at 1205-06.
286. Ecko Prod. Co., 65 F.T.C. at 1220-21.
287. Id. at 1221-23.
288. See id at 1228-30, for Commission's opinion accompanying final order.
289. Id. 1228-30.
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market. 290  The Commission reasoned that because the
McClintock acquisition violated section 7 (on the conglomer-
ate theory), it was appropriate to require Ekco to divest those
assets.29' The fact that Ekco had already dissolved the
Blackman assets and would not be an active market partici-
pant following the divestiture largely was irrelevant accord-
ing to the Commission, as the original McClintock acquisi-
tion, even standing alone, would have violated the Clayton
Act.
292
3. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC
291
In Reynolds, the court of appeals rejected the Commis-
sion's decision to require divestiture of assets beyond those
that the company had acquired.294 The Commission success-
fully challenged the acquisition of Arrow Brands, Inc.-a
small aluminum foil company that manufactured decorative
foil flowers-by Reynolds Metals ("Reynolds"), the largest
firm in the aluminum foil industry.299 Prior to the merger,
Arrow operated out of leased space. 296 Following the merger,
Reynolds constructed a new plant for its Arrow subsidiary
and purchased equipment for that facility.297 Following these
integration activities, the Commission brought suit challeng-
ing the merger as anticompetitive. 298 The Commission found
that the transaction violated section 7 and, as part of the Or-
der for Relief, required Reynolds to divest the Arrow assets
and the newly constructed plant plus related assets.299
The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's conclu-
sion that Reynolds's acquisition of Arrow was anticompetitive
and illegal under section 7.V°  However, the court concluded
that the portion of the order that required the divestiture of
the new facility was overly harsh, punitive, and inconsistent
290. Id. at 1227-28.
291. Id. at 1228-30.
292. Ecko Prod. Co., 65 F.T.C. at 1225-26.
293. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
294. Id at 230-31.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 230.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Reynolds Metals Co., 309 F.2d at 231.
300. Id. at 223.
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with the purpose of section 7.V°" The court concluded that the
remedy "should be decreed as to property obtained by such an
acquisition only when necessary to the restoration of the com-
petitive situation altered by the acquisition"30 2 and should
exclude assets created after the acquisition was completed. 33
b. Remedies Case Law Is Outdated
Case law concerning remedies to redress section 7 viola-
tions is not well-suited for many transactions in today's econ-
omy. The Commission must consider the need to devise a re-
lief package that successfully restores competition to its pre-
merger levels,3° and as noted by the FTC in its 1999 divesti-
ture study, "divestiture of an on-going business is more likely
to result in a viable operation than is divestiture of assets se-
lected to facilitate entry."3 5
Pre- and post-close relief orders, however, are substan-
tially different. It is far easier to order the divestiture of an
ongoing business prior to the combination of business opera-
tions.06 On the other hand, "eggs" are often scrambled follow-
ing close, making it difficult to determine the proper scope of
assets to attribute to the acquired business: "[s]ome mergers
301. Id. at 230-31.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., In re Automatic Data Processing, Inc., No. 9282 (F.T.C. 1996),
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1996/ll/d9282cmp.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on
file with the Santa Clara Law Review). In ADP, the Commission brought suit
challenging the consummated, non-HSR reportable acquisition of the assets of
AutoInfo, ADP's only competitor in the salvage yard information services busi-
ness. In that order, the Commission gave ADP a choice of divestiture options.
ADP was required to divest an on-going business, but was allowed to choose to
divest the entire AutoInfo business or ADP's competitive business, or to license
one of those two businesses, including updates and improvements. Id.
In In re Monier Lifetile L.L.C., the Commission required that the par-
ties would have Monier divest three concrete roofing facilities to a foreign com-
petitor to provide competitive capabilities in three geographic markets where
the Commission determined competitive vigor had been adversely impacted fol-
lowing the combination of business operations of Monier and its closest competi-
tor Boral Ltd. The parties were also required to provide that competitor with
assistance for six months following divestiture. In re Monier Lifetile L.L.C., No.
9290, (F.T.C. Complaint filed on Sept. 22, 1998) at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/O9/moniercmp.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review).
305. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S
DIVESTITURE PROCESS 10 (1999) [hereinafter DIVESTITURE STUDY], at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
306. Id. at 2.
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result in the destruction of productive resources .... Other
mergers result in the firing of employees because their knowl-
edge is duplicative... . Even worse than the loss of
particular elements of a business is the destruction of the or-
ganic nature of an ongoing business acquired in the
merger.""7
Where a transaction has already closed, simple divesti-
ture may be impractical or impossible."' Therefore, case law
properly provides that the Commission may devise alterna-
tive structural relief to restore an industry's pre-transaction
competitive balance." 9 The Commission must have leeway to
devise relief that ensures the restoration of the pre-merger
state of competition. Doubtless, there are cases that require
the divestiture of acquired assets and improvements.310 For
example, to ensure operating success following the divesti-
ture, the FTC's study suggests that in addition to the divesti-
ture of an ongoing business, the buyer may also receive, at a
minimum, information to facilitate the transfer of the di-
vested business, including rights to related technology and in-
tellectual property, technical assistance from the seller, and
employees with special know-how necessary to run the busi-
ness.3 1' As Kenneth Elzinga noted in his study of post-close
relief:
[I]n a dynamic market the reestablishment of firm B as it
existed at the time of acquisition, some five or ten years
later, may not make technological sense; restoration to
premerger status might dictate an outmoded firm with no
chance of survival. Second, it is not illogical to assume
that if the firm B had not been acquired, it would have
added certain improvements itself; thus restoration of firm
B in a meaningful premerger sense requires that it be an
improved firm B that is reestablished. 2
This article does not dispute the conclusion that divesti-
ture may be appropriate to restore the pre-merger competi-
tive balance in an industry, and that often, in post-close chal-
307. Id,
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S 316,
334 (1961).
310. See, e.g., DiAmondAlkali Co., 72 F.T.C. at 704-05.
311. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 305.
312. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories 12 J.L. &
ECON. 43, 59 (1969).
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lenges, structural relief must include improvements that the
acquiring party made to the acquired assets or must include
ancillary relief to ensure that the divestiture package repre-
sents a viable business. There are problems, however, with
wholesale application of these principles to post-close relief
orders in today's economy.
First, the historically strong presumption favoring dives-
titure fails to take into account the efficiencies that many
mergers provide to enhance consumer welfare. In the 1960s
and 1970s, when the bulk of the merger remedies case law
developed, the courts and the antitrust agencies largely ig-
nored the role of efficiencies in merger analysis.313 Today, the
courts more regularly consider efficiencies."' The role of effi-
ciencies likewise should be highlighted when fashioning relief
in consummated merger challenges. If it is possible to rem-
edy a merger's problems without structurally altering the
market or damaging efficiencies or enhancements to con-
sumer wealth, the antitrust agencies and courts should con-
sider alternative, non-structural (i.e., behavioral) relief that
restores the lost competition while simultaneously maintain-
ing a merger's enhancement to consumer welfare.315
313. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963)
(holding that "the effect of [a merger] 'may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion'" in a market, it "is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social
or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial").
314. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 234, at 347 & nn. 187-
90 (citing to prominent district court, appellate, and Commission decisions pay-
ing considerable attention to efficiencies likely to be generated when assessing
the overall merits of a merger); see also 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 236
at § 4; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, REVISION TO SECTION 4 OF
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, [hereinafter 1997 Merger Guidelines], re-
printedin 72 Antitrust & Trade Red Rep. (BNA) 359 (Apr. 10, 1997).
315. In a very recent decision from the Federal Trade Commission to clear a
consummated merger without requiring relief, one of the significant issues fac-
ing the Commission was how to fashion effective post-close relief. As Commis-
sioner Pamela Jones-Harbour observed: "[e]nthusiasm for justifiable enforce-
ment must always be disciplined, however, by pragmatic considerations
regarding the ability to achieve effective relief in a given case." Statement of
Comm'r Pamela Jones-Harbour, supra note 7, at 4.
In Genzyme, the Commission struggled with several questions: how can
one divide research and development efforts that have been merged? How can
an abandoned research and development path be resurrected? How can intel-
lectual property rights be effectively shared? At best, the Commission con-
cluded, that such relief would lead to less than desirable solutions. Thus,
Chairman Muris observed that remedy would be problematic. Ultimately
Chairman Muris concluded, "In]either litigation nor remedial order would likely
benefit Pompe patients. To the contrary, litigation could adversely affect Gen-
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Second, devising remedies that are practical and ade-
quate, yet at the same time not punitive or harmful to the
public, represents a colossal task in post-close challenges. Al-
though the guiding principles are clear-remedies must re-
store the market to its pre-acquisition state without punish-
ing the acquiring party-the preceding case-by-case analysis
reveals that adhering to such principles is difficult.316  As
noted in the Divestiture Study, where companies commingle
assets (as usually happens following close), it is difficult to
determine where the assets of one party end and the other's
begin.317 It is even more challenging to devise a remedy that
both maintains the integrity of the company required to di-
vest the assets and includes a competitively viable set of as-
sets for a prospective buyer.318 Particularly in high-tech mar-
kets, it is often impossible to separate out the assets of the
merged parties following close. In these industries, integra-
tion occurs rapidly. Moreover, the nature of intellectual
property rights and standards makes structural relief diffi-
cult to devise.
Third, while divestiture might be the historically "pre-
ferred" remedy, it can actually harm the public interest.319 In
addition to eliminating any efficiencies generated by a
merger, divestiture can damage the scale generated by a
merger: to order divestiture-while creating an additional
competitor in the market-ignores the fact that the scale
serves the needs of customers. Mergers in networked indus-
tries illustrate this point. Ordering divestiture in a net-
worked industry can lessen the appeal of the network by low-
ering the number of users in the network. By definition, a
network increases utility and consumer welfare for existing
users with the addition of each new one that enters the net-
zyme's incentives to spend on R&D and could disrupt the Novazyme research
program." Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris In re Genzyme Corpora-
tion / Novazyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 20 (2004), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O04/O1murisgenzymestmt.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2004)
(on file with the Santa Clara Law Review). The use of discretion in this decision
offers a promising glimpse into the future: the Commission recognized in Gen-
zyme that such post-close relief orders raise significant possibilities that the
remedy may be worse for consumer welfare than the merger itself.
316. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
317. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 305, at 1-3 & n.4.
318. See id.
319. Id. at 3-4, 11.
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work.32° Thus, unless the agencies order a behavioral remedy,
the splitting of a network potentially lessens consumer value
in the product and forsakes economic welfare. Likewise, di-
vestiture of assets or facilities of a high-tech manufacturer,
for example, may impact that manufacturer's ability to lever-
age technology from the divested product line to other product
lines, possibly inhibiting the company's ability to innovate in
adjacent markets.
Fourth, high-tech companies and products evolve rapidly,
making the agencies task of crafting an appropriate remedy
almost impossible. Two (or even one) years after a transac-
tion closes, the products and/or assets of the acquired firm
may be obsolete with the acquiring party moving the best-of-
breed technology of the acquired party's assets to its own
product line. For example, it would be difficult to devise a di-
vestiture package in a high-tech hardware industry years af-
ter the two companies have assimilated their legacy designs
into a single next-generation product line, incorporating the
unique expertise of each party in the newly merged firm. As-
suming that the assets of the acquired party still existed, they
likely would be old and obsolete. To make a competitively vi-
able business unit quite possibly would cost a colossal amount
of money and would require significant mindshare and re-
sources. This would create a tremendous inefficiency in the
market, and quite possibly in the end, the divested business
would be transitioned to a third party that could not success-
fully maintain the product's position in the market. In high-
tech markets, where acquisitions of competitors are usually
prompted by the desire to purchase and build upon a more
promising technology and one set of assets is most likely infe-
rior or all but abandoned, it is even less likely that these as-
sets will be made viable, much less improved, in the hands of
a third party with no prior experience with the technology.
Thus, the antitrust agencies should consider more ag-
gressively non-structural relief to restore competition. Non-
structural remedies often are more appropriate to cure com-
petitive problems because such relief does not disrupt a
merger's efficiencies and benefits to the parties and to the
320. See Susan Creighton and Perry Narancic, Mergers & Acquisitions: Anti-
trust Issues in High-Tech and Emerging Growth Markets, in 1122 PLI Corpo-
rate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 753, 766 (1999).
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consumers.32 1 For example, in networked industries, divesti-
ture may enable more effective competition but can also im-
pede the establishment of industry standards or force the in-
dustry to choose a second-best alternative.322 Thus, when
choosing between divestiture and non-structural relief, the
agencies should consider: the size of the network, the likeli-
hood of post-merger competition within the network and from
competing networks, the extent to which the merger creates
significant economies of scale, and whether the efficiencies
associated with the increased size of the network will be
passed along to consumers, or instead, will be absorbed by the
merged firm."2 In the end, where it is likely that the network
will achieve significant economies that ultimately will benefit
consumers and competition the agencies should consider non-
structural relief to preserve the vitality of the network rather
than breaking it up.
In the recent MSC.Software litigation, the post-close con-
sent order mandated, among other things, divesture of at
least one clone copy of MSC.Software's current advanced
Nastran software, including the source code, to one or two ac-
quirers who had to be approved by the FTC.32 4 This litigation
highlights some of the more significant concerns associated
with post-close relief in today's high-tech markets. The pro-
ceedings in MSCSoftware cost the acquiring company mil-
lions of dollars, took more than a year to resolve, and resulted
in a diminution in the competitive significance of
MSC.Software's Nastran business unit.2 5 While such an or-
der may restore the pre-acquisition competitive balance in the
321. See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in
Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (Winter 2001).
322. See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved
Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, Prepared Remarks at the Antitrust,
Technology and Intellectual Property Conference, Berkeley Center for Law and
Technology (Mar. 2, 2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/Pitofsky/pf301.htm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
323. See id.
324. See Press Release, FTC, MSC.Software Settles FTC Charges by Divest-
ing Nastran Software, (Aug. 14, 2002), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/mscsoftware.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on
file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
325. See Respondent MSC.Software Corporation's Pre-trial Brief and Pro-
posed Conclusions of Law at 88-89, In re MSC.Software Corp., No. 9299 (F.T.C.
July 1, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9299/020701rmscptb.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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advanced Nastran market, it may also result in significant
harm. Without the scale that MSC.Software previously
achieved through aggressive internal growth, innovation can
slow to the detriment of the product's users. 26  Pre-
acquisition, MSC.Software was the dominant player in the
market327 and presumably did not need to expend tremendous
resources competing against its two inferior rivals. Following
the divestiture order, MSC.Software was required, in essence,
to compete against far stronger rivals, possibly requiring the
company to divert development funds to other competitive ac-
tivities (for example, marketing) that do not provide added
value to strategic development activities.
In addition, the relief secured in MSC.Software essen-
tially requires the company to create either one or two com-
petitors with the same technological capabilities and product
features in order to remedy the harm caused by the com-
pany's decision to acquire two small and competitively disad-
vantaged market participants with arguably inferior and un-
competitive technology. 28 Such relief seems overly punitive.
One must wonder whether the lengthy and costly proceeding
and the resulting order will impair MSC.Software's ability to
compete effectively, causing a reduction, instead of promotion,
of competition.329
Similarly, in Chicago Bridge,33 ° as of the time that this
article went to press, the parties are continuing to litigate be-
fore the Commission the issue of whether the government has
the authority to order certain relief to remedy an alleged
competitive harm from an acquisition that closed more than
two years ago.33' In that litigation, the FTC commenced a sec-
tion 7 action against Chicago Bridge, contending that the ac-
quisition of the Engineered Construction and Water Divisions
of Pitt-De Moines ("PDM") lessened competition in the mar-
326. Id. at 89, 89 n.74.
327. See Press Release, supra note 324.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 9300 (F.T.C. filed Oct. 25, 2001); at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/10/chicagobridgeadmincmp.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
331. See Respondents' Appeal Brief at 52, In re Chicago Bridge & Iron
Comp., No. 9300 (F.T.C. Aug. 8, 2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9300/030808 respondentsappealbrief.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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ket for storage tanks for certain products like liquid nitrogen
and liquid oxygen. 32 The Administrative Law Judge con-
cluded that the two-year-old transaction raised competitive
problems in the markets for certain of the tanks acquired by
Chicago Bridge.333 In order to provide an attractive set of as-
sets to a prospective buyer, the Administrative Law Judge
ordered the divestiture not only of the assets involved in the
challenged transaction that were in these problematic mar-
kets, but also of other assets that are used to manufacture
tank products outside of those competitively problematic
markets. 34 The parties disagree as to whether this order is
appropriately within the remedial reach of sections 7 and 11
of the Clayton Act, or instead, whether it is an undue retribu-
tion disallowed by the antitrust laws.33 Consistent with the
Divestiture Study, the critical question for the Commission to
consider is whether the divestiture of the assets beyond those
acquired is essential to the viability of the divested business
unit. 336
As the court emphasized in Reynolds, an adjudicator
must analyze carefully whether divestiture should be ordered
simply because it is the "preferred remedy."337 In its brief to
the Commission, Chicago Bridge argues that the Administra-
tive Law Judge failed to consider evidence on the issue of the
appropriate relief and instead just presumed that divestiture
was appropriate. 38 Especially where, as in Chicago Bridge,
the Commission seeks relief beyond mere divestiture of the
assets that raise competitive problems to grant the requested
relief, the fact-finder must conclude that such an order of di-
vestiture is necessary to restore competition to its pre-
acquisition levels, and, equally importantly, that there is a
nexus between the divestiture of the additional assets and the
section 7 violation. 9
332. See In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Comp., No 9300, slip op. at 1-2 (F.T.C.
filed October 25, 2001) at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/20O110/chicagobridgeadmincmp.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
333. Id. at 2.
334. Id.
335. See, e.g., Respondent's Appeal Brief, supra note 331, at 52.
336. See id.
337. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 231 (1962).
338. See Respondents' Appeal Brief, supra note 331, at 52.
339. See, e.g., DiamondAlkali, 72 F.T.C. at 741.
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As the Divestiture Study highlights, the generally pre-
ferred form of relief for restoring competition is to divest a
business unit.3 ° In ADP, for example, the Commission or-
dered the divestiture only of the acquired assets;3 4' by con-
trast, in Chicago Bridge, the government further seeks to
compel Chicago Bridge to divest additional assets to ensure
the viability of the divested business and solicit prospective
buyers. " Because the case is pending, it is not entirely clear
from the existing record whether such relief is necessary,
whether the merger generated any efficiencies in the market,
or whether alternative, non-structural relief can achieve the
objectives sought by the required divestiture.
When the antitrust agencies conclude that post-close
challenge and relief are possible, they should avoid blind ad-
herence to the framework of review set forth in older deci-
sions. Because this older case law failed to adequately con-
sider the role of efficiencies in merger analysis and minimized
the role of forms of relief other than divestiture, it provides
relatively little guidance for the present-day merger relief
analysis. 3"
IV. CONCLUSION
The FTC's recent focus on reviewing and challenging
closed transactions raises a host of significant issues that an-
titrust lawyers have only just begun to consider.3 " It is al-
340. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 305, at 1-3.
341. See In re Automatic Data Processing, Inc., No. 9282, slip op., § II (F.T.C.
Oct. 20, 1997) (accepting the terms of a consent decree divestiture package), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/10/autoinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
342. See Answering and Cross-Appeal Brief of Complainant's Counsel at 17,
64-68, In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 9300 (F.T.C. filed Sept. 13, 2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9300/030916ccanswrandcrossappealbrief.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
343. See Kolasky & Dick, supra note 71; see also discussion supra Part
III.B.2.
344. In addition to the MSC.Software and Chicago Bridge challenges, the
FTC has also recently challenged mergers involving Aspen Technology and Air-
gas, summarized below.
Aspen Technology. On August 7, 2003, the FTC brought suit to unwind
a merger, alleging that Aspen Technology, Inc.'s ("AspenTech") $106.1 million
acquisition of Hyprotech, Ltd. ("Hyprotech") in 2002 was anticompetitive. The
transaction was exempt from the reporting obligations of the HSR Act. Accord-
ing to Susan Creighton, director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, "Aspen-
Tech's purchase of Hyprotech directly led to the combination of two of the three
largest firms in the development and sale of certain process engineering simula-
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ready clear, however, that the case law governing the frame-
work for post-consummation review under section 7 is in
many instances inappropriate for the analysis of merger ac-
tivity in today's economy.
Undoubtedly, the FTC has the ability under section 7 to
remedy any anticompetitive transaction, regardless of
whether it has closed or is pending and whether it was below
or above the HSR Act's reporting thresholds. At any time, the
antitrust agencies can intervene and remedy competitive
problems that are caused by mergers unduly concentrating a
market. Nevertheless, aggressive use of the post-close chal-
lenge raises serious legal and practical issues, and may serve
to chill business activity, slow innovation, and ultimately
harm customers.
There are strong considerations that militate against ag-
gressive post-close review. First, high-technology industries
develop rapidly; as a result, markets and market definitions
frequently change. What was a market yesterday is an after-
thought today-for example, no one is concerned about
whether Wang will dominate the Electronic Word Processor
market or IBM the 7.5 (or for that matter 5.25) inch disk
drive market-because markets disappear in the blink of an
eye. Historically, regulatory review focused on a static view
of relevant markets. Because high-tech markets change dy-
tion software." See Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Aspen Technology's Ac-
quisition of Hyprotech, Ltd. Was Anticompetitive (Aug. 7, 2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/08/aspen.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review). The parties settled the case in late July
2004. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Orders Aspen Technology, Inc. to Divest
Assets from its 2002 Purchase of Hyprotech, Ltd. (July 15, 2004), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/aspen.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review).
Airgas. In Airgas, Inc., the Commission challenged Airgas' acquisition
of Puritan Bennett as a section 7 violation. Following its acquisition of Puritan
Bennett, Airgas was the only producer of nitrous oxide in North America. The
Commission and Airgas agreed to substantial relief. It requires Airgas to divest
a nitrous oxide business, which consists of two nitrous oxide production plants,
customer contracts, and all related assets necessary for distribution and storage
to Air Liquide to create a new competitor in the market. The order also requires
Airgas to supply Air Liquide with a specified amount of bulk liquid nitrous ox-
ide from its Florida nitrous oxide production plant to ensure that Air Liquide
has the same volume of nitrous oxide as Airgas did before its acquisition of Pu-
ritan Bennett. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Settlement Would Restore Compe-
tition in U.S. Market for Nitrous Oxide, (Oct. 26, 2001), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 2001/10/airgas.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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namically, it is imperative that the agencies carefully con-
sider whether mergers that lead to apparent concentration
truly are anticompetitive or instead represent a temporary
concentration. As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
observed in United States v. Microsoft, 5 "[r]apid technologi-
cal change leads to markets in which firms compete through
innovation for temporary market dominance, from which they
may be displaced by the next wave of product advance-
ments." 6 Concentration does not result in anticompetitive
market power where the existence of the market itself is only
short-lived.
To the extent the government does challenge mergers
that already have closed, the antitrust agencies should not
simply rely on older case law and Commission decisions. The
appropriate time for analyzing a consummated transaction to
ascertain its competitive effects, the role of post-acquisition
evidence in merger reviews, and presumptions favoring dives-
titure must be re-calibrated to meet the needs of today's mar-
ketplace. In the rare instances where post-consummation re-
view is appropriate to make its case under section 7, the
government must demonstrate that the merger itself is the
competitive problem, not the changing nature of the market
dynamic. Thus, the government must demonstrate through
evidence of the market structure-not simply evidence of
post-close behavior-that a transaction represents a true
competitive concern. Where post-consummation review is
sufficiently remote in time from the merger itself, notwith-
standing case law to the contrary, one must be skeptical that
any competitive concern results from that merger, rather
than from some other dynamic in the marketplace. In such
circumstances, it may be more appropriate to require the gov-
ernment to proceed under the Sherman Act and to demon-
strate that the existing market concentration results in ac-
tual competitive harm, rather than allow the government to
rely on probabilities of such harm in a section 7, Clayton Act
analysis.
Finally, post-close review can paralyze markets. If the
FTC prevails in its post-close challenges, companies like
MSC.Software and Chicago Bridge not only stand to lose the
345. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
346. Id. at 49.
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valuable assets they acquired, but perhaps more importantly,
those companies stand to lose years of independent product
development that they would have engaged in but for the fu-
tile attempt to acquire a competitor. The lost opportunities
for high-tech companies could be considerable: while they
may find themselves in the position they were in prior to the
consummation of a merger later challenged, all of their com-
petitors or potential competitors presumably have moved on
and continued to develop next-generation products during
that time.
As the antitrust agencies continue to challenge consum-
mated mergers, we will need to consider the appropriate
framework for analyzing the effects of those transactions.
The growing number of these challenges will lead to a resolu-
tion of the question whether decades-old law formed in a
marketplace significantly different from today's will have con-
tinued viability, or whether we need a new framework for an-
titrust review.
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